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Psychological factors have important implications for adjustment to chronic pain, which 
itself has a variety of emotional consequences. Mental imagery has historically been 
assumed to be closely connected to emotional responses, and some experimental and 
clinical evidence has supported this claim. Around two in five people with chronic pain 
spontaneously report having mind‟s-eye mental images of their pain, although this 
phenomenon has received only limited research attention. 
 
This study aimed to see whether, for people with chronic pain who report these images, 
evoking their pain images is different from describing their pain using only single 
descriptive words. It was hypothesised that evoking the images would result in a 
stronger negative emotional response, weaker positive emotional response and an 
increase in the perceived pain intensity. It was also hypothesised that, compared to 
baseline scores, emotional and pain intensity ratings would be higher under both 
experimental conditions. Thirty-six participants completed an experiment interview, 
which employed a repeated measures design. The dependent variables were visual 
analogue scale ratings of pain intensity and strength of emotional experience (fear, 
sadness, anger, disgust and happiness). Other measures completed assessed the nature 
of the imagery and level of overall psychological distress. 
 
The study found that evoking pain-related mental images resulted in a temporary 
increase in pain intensity, sadness, anger and disgust and a decrease in happiness. 
However, these emotional responses were no different from those experienced when 
participants described their pain in single words, although this verbal task did not result 
in the increase in pain intensity seen when images were evoked. These results suggest 
that for this group of people, pain imagery is no more closely connected to emotional 
responses than equivalent verbal representations. However, the fact that imagery 
evocation resulted in a temporary increase in pain intensity where the verbal condition 
did not perhaps suggests that this represents a qualitatively different kind of paying 




Chapter 1: Psychological Factors in Chronic Pain 
 
1.1 Definition of chronic pain 
Although pain is an integral part of human experience, defining what people mean when 
they talk about pain presents a complex challenge. Historically, philosophers and 
psychologists have questioned whether pain is best described as a sensation or an 
emotion (Trigg, 1970) . For example, Wittgenstein (1958) notes that the concept of pain 
resembles both a tactile sensation through the characteristics of localisation, duration, 
intensity and quality and at the same time an emotion through its expression in facial 
expressions, gestures and noises. The International Association for the Study of Pain 
(IASP) recognises both the sensory and emotional aspects of pain, defining it as:  
 
„ An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.‟ (Merskey & 
Bogduk, 1994, p.213) 
 
This widely used definition also recognises the complexity of pain and its subjective 
nature. Because there are no objective tests for or physiological markers of pain, to 
understand another person‟s pain we must rely on the subjective narration of their 
personal experience of it (Field & Swarm, 2008).  
 
Pain can be classified along various dimensions; commonly temporal (acute, chronic), 
mechanism of transmission (nociceptive, neuropathic, central), disease state causing the 
pain (for example arthritis) and anatomical site (for example low back pain, headache) 
(Turk & Okifuji, 2001). This thesis is concerned only with chronic pain, which is 
usually defined as pain lasting longer than three or six months (Merskey & Bogduk, 
1994) or pain that persists beyond the expected time for healing (Field & Swarm, 2008), 
although the latter criterion clearly requires some degree of subjective judgement. It is 
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generally understood that unlike acute pain, chronic pain does not serve as a warning of 
further tissue damage and generally serves no adaptive purpose (Taylor, 2003).  
 
1.2 Prevalence and economic impact 
Because there are no objective tests for chronic pain, it is difficult to obtain accurate 
epidemiological data on the prevalence of this condition. A large scale computer 
assisted telephone survey of chronic pain in over 40 thousand adults across 15 European 
countries and Israel found that 19 per cent had moderate to severe pain which seriously 
affected the quality of their social and working lives (Breivik et al., 2006). In the UK, 
prevalence estimates of chronic pain in the general population range from 12 per cent to 
35 per cent (Harstall & Ospina, 2003). In one Scottish study, 50 per cent of a sample of 
3,605 patients from a primary care population were found to meet IASP criteria for 
chronic pain (Elliott et al., 1999). However, this study collected data via a postal survey, 
and thus a response bias may potentially have inflated this prevalence figure.  
 
Chronic pain exacts tremendous costs from patients, employers and the health care 
system. Second only to colds and flu, pain is the foremost reason for visits to physicians 
(Field & Swarm, 2008). Chronic pain in the absence of discernable physical causes is 
the most common reason for lost workdays in the United States (Rosenthal, 1992). 
Using data from the American Productivity Audit, one study (Stewart et al., 2003) 
estimated that 13 per cent of the American workforce lost productive work time due to 
common pain conditions including headache, back pain, arthritis and other 
musculoskeletal conditions. This lost productivity was calculated to cost employers 
$61.2 billion per year, 77 per cent of which was attributed to reduced performance while 
at work rather than work absence. In the UK, Maniadakis and Gray (2000) estimated the 
direct health care cost of back pain in 1998 to be £1632 million, with the indirect costs 
of informal care and loss of economic production totalling £10,668 million. In common 
with findings from other countries, the authors reported that these calculations indicate 
that back pain is one of the most costly conditions to the UK‟s economy. 
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From an individual‟s point of view, chronic pain can have persistent and pervasive 
implications, impacting on cognitive function, reducing engagement with numerous 
activities, disturbing sleep and appetite and upsetting morale (Taylor, 2003). In sum, it 
can dramatically impair the individual‟s social, vocational and psychological well-being 
(Merskey & Bogduk, 1994). Chronic pain has been described as „one of the most 
distressing experiences known to man‟ (Tyrer, 1992, p.3), perhaps partly due to the 
difficulties that traditional medical approaches have had with understanding, explaining 
and treating this phenomenon (Strong, 2002). Chronic pain is thus an important topic of 
study, with advances in our understanding and treatment of this condition potentially 
significantly impacting on our economies and improving the lives of millions of people.  
 
1.3 Psychological factors in theories of pain 
Experiencing acute pain is critical to survival because it provides feedback about the 
functioning of our bodily symptoms. It motivates us to withdraw from damaging or 
potentially damaging stimuli or situations, protect the damaged body part while it heals, 
and avoid those situations in the future (Holden & Winlow, 1984). Descartes (1664) 
famously proposed in his specificity theory of pain that pain messages travel from the 
body to the brain in a mechanical fashion, following a fixed pathway from the site of 
injury. He also suggested that a one-to-one relationship existed between the degree of 
injury and the experience of pain, with psychological factors having no influence on this 
process. However, this and other early dualistic models of the mind (or soul) and body 
as entirely separate 'substances' began to be challenged in the mid 20
th
 century by a 
variety of medical and scientific observations. For example, Dr Henry Beecher (1946; 
1956) noted that even when they experienced similar physical injury, civilians and 
wounded soldiers made vastly different subjective pain reports and requests for 
medication. His opinion was that this was because civilians and soldiers attributed 
differing meanings to the pain, and by suggesting this he was one of the first to propose 
a strong role for psychological factors as well as physical ones in pain perception.  
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Melzack and Wall (1965, 1982) developed the gate control theory of pain, which asserts 
that both physiological and psychological factors play a significant role in pain 
experiences. Their model proposed that the transmission of pain-related nerve impulses 
is modulated by a „gating‟ mechanism at the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, which can 
be affected by physical, emotional and behavioural factors. The gate control theory 
states that pain perception is influenced by the balance between large- and small-
diameter nerve fibre activity, with small-diameter fibres facilitating transmission (i.e. 
opening the gate) and large-diameter fibres inhibiting transmission (closing the gate). 
Melzack and Casey (1968) extended the gate control theory, proposing that pain is 
comprised of three dimensions: sensory-discriminative, cognitive-evaluative and 
affective-motivational. Thus pain is determined not only by physiological factors (for 
example location, duration and intensity of the stimulus) but also cognitive evaluations 
of its meaning (influenced by, for example, appraisal and cultural beliefs) and 
unpleasant emotional responses that serve to motivate behaviour, often escape.  
 
By allowing for the existence of mediating variables and emphasising active perception 
rather than passive sensation, Melzack and colleagues‟ work significantly influenced 
research and generated much interest in understanding the influence of psychological 
variables on pain. However, the gate control theory‟s assumption of there being an 
organic basis for pain has led to criticisms due to its difficulty in explaining phantom 
limb pain (Ogden, 2007). Additionally, most of the dorsal horn neurons identified in the 
theory as inhibitory are in fact excitatory (Woolf, 2007). However, although there have 
been substantial advances in the understanding of the neurophysiology of pain 
transmission, the gate control model remains an important heuristic for understanding 
and treating pain (Field & Swarm, 2008). Furthermore, Melzack and Casey's (1968) 
description of the dimensions of pain continues to guide research in the functional 
neuroanatomy and psychology of pain (Skevington, 1995). 
 
As a result of extensive research on the neurophysiology of pain and the use of 
functional brain imaging, pain is no longer understood as a primitive sensory message 
recognised by the somatosensory cortex but rather the end product of massive 
distributed and parallel processing within the brain (Turk & Okifuji, 2002). Pain has 
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emotional and cognitive features because it is the end product of central processing in 
brain areas that produce the interdependent processes of emotion and cognition. 
Furthermore as highly social animals, human pain is always subject to a social context 
which can have significant effects on pain perception, expression and response 
(Skevington, 1995). 
 
1.4 Psychological factors in chronic pain 
Although there is debate about when acute pain transitions to chronic pain, there is good 
evidence that psychological factors play a role in this transition (Linton, 2000) and are 
particularly important in chronic pain perception and coping (Field & Swarm, 2008). 
Following the recognition that conventional medical management approaches were 
inadequate and the importance of psychological factors in chronic pain, the IASP 
advocated a multi-disciplinary approach (Loeser, 1991). Thus it is now common to find 
chronic pain teams which include psychologists working alongside, for example, 
physicians, nurses, physiotherapists and occupational therapists (Strong, 2002). 
 
Chronic pain involves the complex interaction of physiological, psychological, social 
and behavioural components (Taylor, 2003) and is often associated with serious mental 
health effects (Tyrer, 1992). This thesis will now provide an overview of the well 
established behavioural, emotional and cognitive factors involved in the experience of 
chronic pain. 
 
1.4.1 Behavioural factors 
With the rise of behaviourism in the 20
th
 century came the proposal that operant 
conditioning principles could be used to explain and modify chronic pain behaviours. 
Fordyce (1976) was the pioneer of this approach, which proposed that acute pain 
behaviours, although initiated by a traumatic injury or disease, are reinforced over time 
by interpersonal and environmental factors. In chronic pain, these become illness 
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behaviours which increase both pain perception and disability. Pain behaviours include 
distorted posture or movement, negative affect, facial/audible expressions of distress 
and avoidance of activity (Turk et al., 1985). These may be positively reinforced via, for 
example, sympathy and attention or negatively reinforced through a reduction in 
immediate pain or time off work. Some authors have argued that the operant 
conditioning model by itself is overly simplistic, and each person‟s beliefs about the 
cause of their pain and how it should be managed must also be understood to account 
fully for illness behaviours. For example, persistent help-seeking behaviours may stem 
from a pain evaluation which leads to expectations that more can still be done to cure 
pain (James, 1992b).  
  
Experimental research has provided some support for the role of positive reinforcement 
in pain reporting. For example, in a study which involved experimentally induced pain 
in chronic back pain patients and healthy matched controls, Flor et al. (2002) found that 
the chronic pain patients displayed slower extinction when visual and monetary 
reinforcers of pain ratings were ceased. This was the case whether the reinforcement 
was of elevated or reduced pain ratings, and was not seen in the healthy matched 
controls. The authors suggest that the chronic pain patients were more easily influenced 
by operant conditioning factors and that this susceptibility may add to the maintenance 
of chronic pain. This study is commendable because it used a clinical population, 
however in common with other research which uses experimentally induced brief pain, 
the generalisability of this to chronic pain is questionable.  
 
The validity of behaviourist accounts is supported by the success of behaviour change 
programmes which aim to reduce illness behaviours and increase „well behaviours‟ 
through manipulations of reinforcers (Fordyce et al., 1985). However, one criticism of 
these programmes is that although they may reduce, for example, the verbal expressions 
of pain, they do not actually treat pain per se but instead train patients to be more stoical 
about it (Schmidt, 1987). On the other hand, while the pain itself may not be affected, 
interventions which are successful in reducing the disability associated with pain may 
still be regarded as useful approaches (Skevington, 1995). 
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1.4.2 Emotional factors 
The perception of pain has been shown to be attenuated or amplified by emotional 
processes (Craig, 2005). From a biological point of view, it has been proposed that pain, 
anxiety and depression may have a common neurochemical substrate in the serotonergic 
systems (Blier & Abbott, 2001). However, examining the emotional aspects of pain can 
be conceptually challenging as emotional distress serves not only as a component of 
pain but it can also be a cause of pain or concurrent problem from an independent 
source (Feuerstein & Skjei, 1979). Although this problem can be overcome by 
conceptualising both pain and emotion as multidimensional and sometimes overlapping 
processes with reciprocal influences on each other (Craig, 2005), critical literature 
reviews by Gamsa (1990) and Fishbain et al. (1997) suggest that emotional disturbance 
is more likely to be a consequence of chronic pain than an antecedent to it. The 
relationships between pain and each of the five basic emotions (fear, sadness, anger, 
happiness and disgust
1
) will be briefly reviewed below.  
 
1.4.2.1 Fear 
By their very nature, noxious stimuli will often evoke basic fearful responses. In 
patients who have experienced pain, the fear of this pain increasing or reoccurring can 
lead to the avoidance of a range of activities that are perceived to be high risk (Ogden, 
2007). In the short term, avoidance of and escape from these activities will be 
negatively reinforced as pain intensity will decrease. The fear-avoidance model (Leeuw 
et al., 2007; Lethem et al., 1983; Slade et al., 1983) proposes that this phenomenon can 
explain how and why musculoskeletal pain can become a chronic pain syndrome in 
some people but not others. The model states that some people respond to the fear of 
pain by confronting it, which leads to a reduction of fear over time as gentle exercise 
gradually decreases the pain intensity. However for others who avoid the pain, the fear 
is maintained and exacerbated, possibly generating a phobic state and resulting in 
restricted behaviours, hypervigilance to illness information and physical deconditioning 
                                                 
1
 See section 2.1.2 for an overview of the evidence for the existence of these categories 
9 
which all conspire to increase the pain intensity and interference (Vlaeyen & Linton, 
2000).  
 
This model is supported by a variety of research evidence, including a methodologically 
robust prospective study conducted by Linton et al. (2000). This study measured fear-
avoidance beliefs (among other variables) in a community sample of 449 people who 
had reported no spinal pain during the preceding year. One year later, data from 415 
people (92 per cent) were collected which indicated that 19 per cent of the sample had 
experienced an episode of back pain. People who had scores above the median on the 
measure of fear-avoidance beliefs at baseline were twice as likely to report an episode 
of back pain and had a 1.7 times higher risk of lowered physical functioning.  
 
Within an occupational setting, a cross-sectional study of 1294 employees in Belgium 
and the Netherlands found that pain-related fear was a key risk factor for prolonged 
lower back pain (Gheldof et al., 2005). Other researches have suggested that fear of 
pain is more disabling than pain itself, as it increases the amount of attention demanded 
by the pain, which in turn results in a lowered ability to focus on other activities 
(Crombez et al., 1999).  
 
From a biological point of view, pain, anxiety and tension can exacerbate each other in 
a well known vicious cycle seen in patients with musculoskeletal pain. Pain provokes 
anxiety because it is interpreted as a threat to well-being, self esteem and control 
(James, 1992b). The physiological element of anxiety can then result in prolonged 
muscle spasm at the pain location and other trigger points as well as vasoconstriction 
and the release of pain-producing substances (Craig, 2005). This then results in further 
pain and further anxiety. However, while this cycle is known to exacerbate pain, 
increased muscle tension alone cannot fully account for chronic pain in these patients 
(Turner & Chapman, 1982). 
 
A significant proportion of people with chronic pain are also diagnosed with one or 
more anxiety disorders. For example, in a sample of 382 arthritis patients with chronic 
pain, 35 per cent also met criteria (assessed via structured interview) for one or more 
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anxiety disorders, compared to 18 per cent in the general population (McWilliams et al., 
2003). Furthermore, another study reported that up to half of patients attending a 
hospital psychiatric clinic reported experiencing chronic pain (Spear, 1967). 
Comorbidity is thought to be common not only because pain itself can elicit fearful 
responses, but also because trauma (for example through battle or a road traffic 
accident) can be a trigger for both injury-related pain and post-traumatic stress disorder, 
phobia or panic disorder (Gallagher & Verma, 2004). Additionally it is possible that 
personality factors could make individuals vulnerable to both chronic pain and anxiety 
disorders. For example, an individual‟s level of trait anxiety has been shown to be 
directly correlated with increased pain perception in laboratory induced pain in a student 
sample (James & Hardardottir, 2002) as well as in, for example, patients with chronic 
pelvic pain (McGowan et al., 1998). However, a number of studies have failed to find 
effects of personality variables on chronic pain, and overall it appears that there is little 
conclusive evidence supporting the idea of a „pain-prone‟ personality (Linton, 2000). 
 
Partial evidence for the close link between fear and pain is found in the effectiveness of 
pain management interventions which utilise relaxation. Relaxation training has been 
found to be effective in reducing tension headache frequency (Turner & Chapman, 
1982), and pain intensity, depression symptoms and disability in patients with chronic 
low back pain (Turner & Jensen, 1993). Relaxation is thought to help reduce fear, 
physical arousal and muscle tension and therefore also pain (Weisenberg, 1987).  It is 
also likely that if a patient learns that they are able to reduce their pain through their 
own efforts this will improve their perceived control and self efficacy, which are also 
thought to be closely linked to pain perception (see 1.4.3.2). Thus although it is clear 
that relaxation training is effective, its action is likely to be multifaceted and therefore 
not only because of its ability to reduce fear.  
 
1.4.2.2 Sadness 
There is little research looking specifically at sadness in itself in chronic pain, although 
there is a large body of evidence examining the link and nature of the relationship 
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between chronic pain and depression. On the basis of self-report methods, the 
prevalence of depression in the chronic pain population has been estimated to be 
anywhere from 20 to 80 per cent (Gallagher & Verma, 2004), however more stringent 
criteria have placed the estimate at 30-54 per cent (Banks & Kerns, 1996). A large-scale 
population-based survey of musculoskeletal pain and depression in the United States 
found that 16 per cent of people with chronic pain met stringent psychiatric criteria for 
depression, in comparison to the 6 per cent who met the criteria in the population who 
did not have chronic pain (Magni et al., 1993). On the basis of a large scale European 
study of over 4800 people with chronic pain, Fricker (2003) suggests that 19 per cent of 
the chronic pain population meet criteria for a diagnosis of depression, with up to half 
reporting feelings of helplessness or an inability to think or function normally.  
 
These comorbidity prevalence estimates vary widely for a number of reasons. Estimates 
will be different on the basis of whether mild depressive disorders (such as dysthymia 
and adjustment disorder) are included or because of the nature of the assessment 
methods used (self-report questionnaire vs. structured interview with strict diagnostic 
criteria). Physical diagnoses in a psychiatric population are difficult to make because 
these patients tend to use pain language in a relatively indiscriminate and diffuse 
manner (Craig, 2005). Additionally there are overlapping symptoms between chronic 
pain and depression, for example some somatic symptoms of depression (insomnia, 
fatigue, changes in appetite, attention and concentration problems) could be partially or 
entirely attributable to the pain itself or medication used to treat it (Field & Swarm, 
2008; Skevington, 1995).  
 
Despite the problems associated with measuring comorbidity however, it is clear that 
chronic pain and depression often exist together. Depression may be a consequence of 
coping with pain, it may precede the onset of pain or pain and depression may co-occur. 
Clinical observation suggests that the commonest presentation within the chronic pain 
population is of mild to moderate depression, secondary to physical illness (James, 
1992b). In support of this, a systematic review of pain and depression found that there 
was more evidence for depression being a consequence of chronic pain than an 
antecedent (Fishbain et al., 1997). However, reflecting the nature of the population and 
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diversity of research methods, the studies in this review were heterogeneous in terms of 
type of chronic pain and the criteria used for diagnosing depression.  
 
In terms of formulation, it is clear that depression could be a consequence of living not 
only with pain but also the associated physical limitations, interpersonal consequences 
and multiple losses that may occur. Furthermore, recursive vicious cycles may develop 
whereby pain increases unpleasant affect, promotes access to memories of unpleasant 
events and thoughts, which in turn intensifies the unpleasant affect and helps perpetuate 
the pain (Eich et al., 1990). When someone with chronic pain has comorbid depression, 
this can complicate the presentation, clinical course, and their response to treatment 
(Leo, 2005).  
 
According to a study by Keefe et al. (1986), depression can increase a patient‟s 
perception of pain and the extent to which they engage in chronic pain behaviours. This 
research examined the degree to which depression (measured using the Beck 
Depression Inventory) predicted pain and pain behaviour in 207 low back pain patients. 
Utilising regression methods, the researchers found that even after demographic and 
medical status variables were controlled for, depression still predicted a modest but 
significant amount of the variance in pain behaviours during physical examination and 
patient ratings of pain. While this study is commendable in that it controlled for a 
number of other predictor variables, the correlational relationship found does not 
indicate causality. However, some interesting experimental research has suggested that 
an induced sad mood will lower a person‟s tolerance to pain but not their ratings of pain 
intensity in a cold pressor immersion (Zelman et al., 1991).  
 
1.4.2.3 Anger 
The majority of research examining affect in pain has focussed on depression and 
anxiety; however anger is now increasingly being recognised as an important emotional 
component of chronic pain (Fernandez & Turk, 1995; Greenwood et al., 2003). People 
with chronic pain often report feeling angry at themselves, others or their life situation 
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(Okifuji et al., 1999). In a study which sought to identify which of the nine primary 
emotions [based on Izard‟s (1991) categories] were key in chronic pain, Fernandez and 
Milburn (1994) found that anger, fear and sadness were the strongest predictors of the 
affective component of pain. From a biological perspective, anger (as with fear and 
sadness) can provoke substantial autonomic, visceral and skeletal activity which can 
then result in increased pain (Craig, 2005). Clinical and some research evidence suggest 
that chronic pain and anger ratings are connected, for example Gaskin et al. (1992) 
found state anger to be an important predictor of affective pain ratings. In addition to 
exacerbating pain, anger and its expression can cause difficulty with pain management 
as it can disrupt relationships with healthcare providers, partners, family, friends and co-
workers (Greenwood et al., 2003).  
 
Some researchers have emphasised the cognitive appraisal component of anger in 
chronic pain; namely disapproving of someone‟s blameworthy action and being 
displeased about the related undesirable event (Fernandez & Turk, 1995). However, 
there is also some evidence that certain stimuli which are physiologically offensive such 
as pain, foul odours and high temperatures can innately trigger angry reactions without 
cognitive mediation, although cognitive processes can suppress, intensify or modify this 
primitive response (Berkowitz, 1993). 
 
Wade et al. (1990) explored the relationship between anger, frustration, anxiety, fear 
and depression and pain-related unpleasantness (all measured using visual analogue 
scales). They found that anxiety and frustration were the most important predictors of 
emotional unpleasantness after the influence of pain sensation was controlled for. 
However, the types of negative affect they chose to examine were not based on a 
theoretical consideration of the nature of basic emotions (discussed further in 2.1.2).  
 
Other researchers have examined the different styles of anger expression and their 
relationship to chronic pain intensity and behaviour. Some models of pain propose that 
chronic pain can result from a pervasive inability to express negative emotions (Braha 
& Catchlove, 1986), and in support of this Kerns et al. (1994) found that an emotional 
management style of inhibiting the expression of angry feelings was the strongest 
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predictor of pain intensity and pain behaviour. However, other researchers have pointed 
out that the majority of the evidence for an aetiological role for anger suppression in 
pain has utilised correlational methods which cannot prove causality, and that it is less 
contentious to suggest that inhibited anger may exacerbate rather than cause chronic 
pain (Fernandez & Turk, 1995). 
 
1.4.2.4 Disgust 
Little research has examined the relationship between chronic pain and disgust, 
although some qualitative research indicated that a sample of ten women with chronic 
muscular pain were disgusted by the illness-focussed talk of others with similar medical 
presentations who complained about their pain (Werner et al., 2004). The authors 
suggest that their interview transcripts (interpreted within a feminist frame of reference, 
inspired by narrative theory and discourse analysis) reveal that talking about illness is a 
private and forbidden subject which should not be done because it becomes whining and 
complaining. This is seen by the authors as an expression of a culture‟s marginalising, 
disgust and tabooing of illnesses such as medically unexplained symptoms. While this 
raises some interesting ideas about feelings of disgust in chronic pain patients, in 
common with other qualitative research which utilise very small and select samples, the 
generalisability of the findings is limited.  
 
Other research has examined facial expressions in patients with chronic pain, to 
ascertain whether a reliable and valid facial expression of pain could be identified in a 
similar way to the large body of research which has identified the universal human 
facial expressions of the emotions anger, fear, enjoyment, sadness and disgust (Ekman, 
1992). LeResche and Dworkin (1988) videotaped the facial expressions of 28 patients 
with chronic temporomandibular disorder pain during a painful clinical examination 
procedure and coded their expressions using a anatomically based system. They found 
that they could identify a particular facial expression associated with pain, and also 
identified that six (21 per cent) of their subjects displayed a facial expression of disgust 
during the examination. In a study which examined 60 health professionals‟ judgements 
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of facial expressions, Kappesser and Williams (2002) found that pictures of pain facial 
expressions were identified correctly by 75 per cent of the participants, with 19 per cent 
of the professionals incorrectly categorising pain faces as expressing disgust. A related 
study by Keltner (1996) also found that 20 per cent of subjects misidentified pain as 
disgust. The fact that facial expressions of pain are more often confused with disgust 
than any other emotion suggests that that the demonstration of pain and disgust are 
closely related.  
 
1.4.2.5 Happiness 
Very few studies have specifically examined happiness in the chronic pain population. 
However, a large body of research on experimentally induced pain suggests that 
manipulations that have a positive effect on mood or emotional state will reduce pain 
perception (Craig, 2005; Villemure & Bushnell, 2002). Positive affect has been 
generated through music (Roy et al., 2008), affective pictures (Meagher et al., 2001), 
photographs of loved ones (Master et al., 2009), inducing laughter (Cogan et al., 1987), 
and pleasant odours (Marchand & Arsenault, 2002). Other research has suggested that 
the relationship between happiness and experimentally induced pain intensity is not this 
straightforward. For example, Villemure and Bushnell (2002) suggest that the 
interpretation of these studies is difficult because they do not always clearly dissociate 
changes in mood from changes in attention. In a study in which they manipulated 
attention and emotional state separately, Villemure et al. (2003) found that focussing 
attention on the pain increased pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings, whereas mood 
manipulations changed only the pain unpleasantness but not the pain intensity.  
 
Some research indicates that positive moods change the tolerance of pain rather than the 
pain intensity. For example, a study which encouraged participants to think of images 
that produced positive feelings such as self-assertion, pride or mirth enhanced cold-
pressor pain tolerance (Horan & Dellinger, 1974 ). Zelman et al. (1991) found that a 
group of participants who underwent elated mood induction (through reading positive 
statements) displayed no difference in (cold-pressor) pain intensity ratings but did 
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demonstrate increased pain tolerance in comparison to a group who had a depressive 
mood induced. However, the lack of difference in pain ratings in this study should be 
interpreted with caution because the authors report that as their data were positively 
skewed they used non-parametric statistics rather than utilising transformations and then 
employing (more powerful) parametric methods.  
 
Skevington (1995) argues that positive perceptions of well-being and happiness should 
be included in a holistic assessment of people with chronic pain. The few studies which 
have examined this suggest that positive as well as negative emotions are closely tied to 
pain. For example, when Fernandez and Milburn (1994) assessed emotion and the 
affective component of pain in 40 people with chronic pain they found that emotions 
which were neutral or positive (surprise, interest and joy) were inversely related to pain-
related distress. Additionally, a study of 70 pain patients with intervertebral disk disease 
indicated that while negative mood best predicted pain severity (accounting for 21 per 
cent of the variance in scores), positive moods could explain a substantial 16 per cent of 
the variance (Shacham & Cleeland, 1984 ). 
 
1.4.3 Cognitive factors 
The cognitive movement in psychology in the latter half of the twentieth century 
brought with it a significant rise in interest in the cognitive factors relevant to pain. A 
full review of these is outwith the scope of this thesis, however the research examining 
attention and distraction as well as some of the key beliefs thought to impact on chronic 
pain will be discussed.  
 
1.4.3.1 Attention and distraction 
The interaction between attention and pain has been studied both in terms of the effects 
of attending to pain (top-down) and the impact of pain on attention (bottom-up). 
Neuroimaging studies suggest that these two processes have distinct associated brain 
structures but also interact (Legrain et al., 2009; Villemure & Bushnell, 2002).  
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Attention directs limited perceptual resources to selected stimuli in the internal and 
external environment (Chapman & Okifuji, 2004). Both experimental and clinical 
studies have demonstrated that deliberately paying attention to pain can lead to 
temporary increases in reports of pain severity whereas distraction can reduce pain 
intensity (Brewer & Karoly, 1989; Ogden, 2007; Villemure et al., 2003). James (1992b) 
suggests that this fact can make chronic pain worse for people who have a tendency or 
bias to notice internal sensations due to previous illness, degree of introspection or 
family attentiveness. 
 
Distraction techniques as a method of decreasing perceived pain intensity have been 
explored with both acute and chronic pain. Techniques include listening to music, 
reading, focusing on the immediate environment, concentrating on mental activities and 
paying attention to alternative bodily sensations such as warmth, breathing and touch 
(James, 1992a). Many researchers have suggested that distraction is effective because it 
consumes some of a person‟s limited attentional capacity thereby preventing their full 
attention from being available for the cognitive interpretations which are crucial to the 
degree of pain-associated distress experienced (Legrain et al., 2009; McCaul & Malott, 
1984).  
 
Some experimental research indicates that the effectiveness of distraction is dependent 
on the motivational relevance of the task, particularly among people who display 
catastrophic thinking about pain (Verhoeven et al., 2010). Another study suggested that 
the effectiveness of distraction also depends on levels of trait anxiety (James & 
Hardardottir, 2002). These interactions demonstrate how the complex interplay of 
attention, motivation, traits and beliefs can make designing effective interventions for 
pain difficult.  
 
Distraction techniques appear to be most successful with acute low-level pain (Taylor, 
2003) but it has been suggested that their beneficial effects are only seen after a delay 
because they alter the memory of pain rather that the perceived intensity at the time 
(Christenfeld, 1997). For people with chronic pain, continual distraction as utilised in 
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experimental research on acute pain is not possible. However, distraction techniques can 
be helpful during episodes of increased pain (Waters et al., 2004) and their successful 
use can have a general positive impact on evaluations of self efficacy.  
 
In terms of bottom-up processing, Eccleston and Crombez (1999) report that pain 
interrupts and demands attention, a natural mechanism by which the individual is 
prompted to act or escape to relieve the pain. This shift in attention results in a reduced 
ability to focus on other tasks, a hypothesis which has been supported in a number of 
experimental studies (Crombez et al., 1998; 1999; Eccleston, 1994). Again, complex 
interactions in this process emerge, for example the amount of attention demanded is 
influenced by how somatically aware the person is as well as the degree of negative 
affect (Eccleston et al., 1997). 
 
1.4.3.2 Beliefs 
People‟s beliefs about pain have strong associations with their ability to function and 
adjust to living with chronic pain (Jensen et al., 1991). For example, a common belief 
amongst chronic pain patients is that increased physical activity will cause harm 
(Philips, 1987), whereas for chronic benign pain the opposite is recommended for 
treatment and rehabilitation. Research has also found that people with chronic pain 
often refer to changes in the weather as a reason behind an increase or decrease in their 
pain (Shutty et al., 1992), although systematic investigation has failed to find scientific 
evidence for this (Redelmeier & Tversky, 1996). Whether or not this belief is an 
accurate one however, it implies an external source of control of pain symptoms, which 
may undermine positive self efficacy beliefs.  
 
A patient‟s sense of pain-related self efficacy  (i.e. the extent to which they believe in 
their ability to control their pain and function in spite of it) is negatively correlated with 
measures of depression and ratings of disability amongst chronic pain patients (Turner 
et al., 2005). A study which utilised regression methods has also found that self efficacy 
beliefs are a more important determinant of disability than fear-avoidance levels, pain 
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intensity and pain duration in chronic musculoskeletal pain (Eva et al., 2004). Other 
researchers suggest that increased pain self efficacy may be an important factor in 
determining the degree of pain perception (Turk et al., 1983). 
 
Another cognitive factor which has received much research attention in chronic pain is 
catastrophising. According to Keefe et al. (2000), catastrophising involves three 
components: (a) rumination – focussing on threatening internal and external 
information, (b) magnification – overestimating the extent of the threat and (c) 
helplessness – underestimating personal and external resources which may reduce the 
danger or disastrous consequences. Catastrophising has been linked to the transition 
from acute to chronic pain as well as the maintenance of chronic pain (Sullivan et al., 
2001). It has also been found to be predictive of pain intensity, psychological distress 
and pain-related disability even after controlling for the effects of demographic and 
injury-related variables in patients with chronic pain and spinal cord injury (Turner et 
al., 2002). A study by Crombez et al. (1998) indicated that catastrophising also impacts 
on attention such that high catastrophisers have more difficulty diverting their attention 
away from pain. However, this study used a non-clinical undergraduate population and 
experimentally induced pain and therefore caution should be exercised when 
generalising the results to the chronic pain population.  
 
According to a review by Jensen et al. (1991), patients who believe they can control 
their pain, who avoid catastrophising and who believe that they are not severely 
disabled, function better than those who do not. However, much the data supporting 
these assertions is correlational and beliefs measured at different stages of treatment 
may reflect a state of mind rather than a personality trait and so consequently, cause and 
effect are not always clear (Craig, 2005). Nevertheless, cognitive approaches to chronic 
pain management have been effective (Weisenberg, 1998). Specifically, one element of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is concerned with targeting unhelpful beliefs, 
and this approach has been applied successfully to numerous chronic pain problems. 
Meta-analyses have indicated that CBT is efficacious in improving health-related 
quality of life, reducing pain intensity, pain-related interference, behavioural expression 
of pain and depression (Hoffman et al., 2007; Morley et al., 1999).  
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The beliefs discussed in this section are predominantly expressed through verbal 
language-based constructs. However, cognition is commonly conceptualised as 
consisting of both language-based and image-based thoughts. Images in particular are 
thought to be closely tied to emotional experience and processing (Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). Chapter 3 will explore and discuss imagery in chronic pain but first Chapter 2 
will discuss the current conceptualisation of mental imagery within academic 






Chapter 2: Imagery and Emotion 
 
2.1 Definitions 
2.1.1 Mental imagery 
The form and function of human internal mental representation has been a source of 
fascination for philosophers, linguists and psychologists for centuries. The concept of 
mental imagery likewise has an extensive history, for example over 2000 years ago 
Aristotle regarded imagery as the main medium of thought (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). 
Mental imagery has long been conceptualised as a type of thought, an analogical 
representation of cognition. Kosslyn et al. (2006) report that: 
 
„a mental image occurs when a representation of the type created during the 
initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually being 
perceived; such representations preserve the perceptible properties of the 
stimulus and ultimately give rise to the subjective experience of perception‟ 
(Kosslyn et al., 2006, p.4) 
 
This definition of mental imagery highlights that it is a mental phenomenon that a 
person is consciously aware of, but may or may not deliberately call to mind. It can be 
spontaneous (for example while dreaming) or intentionally generated (for example 
while trying to remember someone‟s appearance). A mental image may include any 
modality of sensory perception and so may be visual, olfactory, auditory, gustatory, 
proprioceptive or tactile (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). However, visually-based mental 




Defining precisely what is meant by the term „emotion‟ can become a complex debate 
about the theoretical approach to the structure of emotion, yet emotions are a familiar 
concept and the word is used frequently in everyday language. The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2008) defines emotion as: 
 
„a strong feeling deriving from one's circumstances, mood, or relationships with 
others‟ (Sloans & Stevenson, 2008, p.374). 
 
Emotions are characterised by changes in facial expression, physiological disturbance, 
gestures, behaviours and particular types of thoughts, beliefs and desires (Power & 
Dalgleish, 2008). There has been a great deal of debate concerning the structure of 
emotions, with some theorists preferring a categorical approach and others dimensional 
models. Although there is much support for the dimensional approach, the majority of 
researchers have adopted a categorical one (Eysenck & Keane, 2010). 
 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) proposed that there are five basic emotions (fear, 
sadness, anger, disgust and happiness) which occur universally in humans and are 
elicited by significant junctures of plans or goals. Fear occurs when a self-preservation 
goal is threatened and sadness when there is a failure of a major plan or loss of active 
goal. Anger occurs when a current goal is frustrated or blocked, disgust when a 
gustatory goal is violated and happiness when progress has been made or a goal has 
been achieved. The conditions under which disgust is elicited has been further 
extrapolated by Dalgleish and Power (2004) to include an appraisal involving an 
unwanted contamination by a person, object or idea that is repulsive to the self,  
valued roles, goals or ideals. Evidence from a range of sources supports the universality 
of these five emotions, including cross-cultural studies of facial expression, structural 
equation analysis of emotion linguistic terms, research on characteristic neurological 
activity and physiological signals as well as studies of emotional development in 
children (Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 2000; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power & 
Dalgleish, 2008; Power, 2006).  
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2.2 Theoretical models 
There are several theoretical models which attempt to describe the nature of cognition 
(including imagery) and the link between cognition and emotion. As an evaluation of all 
of these is outwith the scope of this thesis, only the two theories which are most relevant 
to this work will be discussed, namely dual coding theory (Paivio, 1972) and the 
Schematic, Propositional, Analogical and Associative Representational Systems 
(SPAARS) model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008). 
 
2.2.1 Dual coding theory   
Following observations from a number of different memory and learning experiments 
(some of which explicitly utilised imagery methods), Allan Paivio (e.g. 1971; 1972, 
1990) proposed that there are two distinct systems for the representation and processing 
of information. A verbal system deals with linguistic information and stores it in an 
appropriate verbal form and a separate non-verbal system carries out image-based 
processing and representation. A wealth of experimental data supports this theory, 
including the outcomes of memory tasks and neuropsychological studies (Eysenck & 
Keane, 2000). For example, Paivio (1972) proposed that the reason memory for pictures 
is superior to memory for verbal material is because imagery conditions increase the 
probability that both imaginal and verbal processes are engaged in the task of retrieval. 
Neuropsychological data indicate that that there is localisation of the two symbolic 
systems within the brain, as generally speaking the left hemisphere is used for language-
based processing, and the right for non-verbal material such as face identification (Kolb 
& Whishaw, 2003).  
 
Paivio argued that both propositional (conceptual, abstract and language-like) and 
analogical (sensory and picture-like) forms of mental representation are essential to any 
understanding of human cognition. However, other psychologists such as Pylyshyn (e.g. 
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1973; 1981, 1999) deny the validity of an analogical-propositional distinction, and 
assert that the external world is represented mentally entirely by propositions. Towards 
the end of the twentieth century, much research was conducted that provided evidence 
for one or other of these two schools of thought in the so-called „Great Imagery Debate‟ 
(Denis, 1991). Although more recently the propositional-analogical debate and dual 
coding theory has generated much less research interest, the basic premise behind dual 
coding theory of a verbal vs. nonverbal distinction continues to influence cognitive and 
other psychological models (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996a; Sun, 2002).  
 
2.2.2 SPAARS  
A more recent model of cognition which also takes account of the distinction between 
conscious and non-conscious emotional processes is the Schematic, Propositional, 
Analogical and Associative Representational Systems (SPAARS) model proposed by  
Power and Dalgleish (1997, 2008). This model is represented schematically in Figure 1.  
 
 




In this multi-level model, the analogical system is involved with basic sensory 
processing of stimuli, be that visual, olfactory, auditory, gustatory, proprioceptive or 
tactile information. Note that the „event‟ processed this way can be the „live‟ 
environment or the result of memory recall. The analogical output then feeds into three 
semantic representation systems which link to each other and operate in parallel. The 
propositional level is the most language-like (although not language-specific) and 
contains beliefs, ideas, objects and concepts and the relations between them. The 
associative level (below the level of conscious awareness) can lead directly to the 
generation of emotion (route two) as the result of repeated stimuli-response pairs as 
seen in classical conditioning. Within the schematic model level, information from the 
analogical, propositional and/or associative levels is combined with information about 
the person‟s current goals to produce an internal model of the situation. This appraisal 
process then leads to the generation of emotion (route one), as described by Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird (1987). 
 
One of SPAARS‟ strengths lies in the fact that it provides an account of everyday 
emotional responses as well as those seen in emotional disorders. It was developed 
following a review of the evidence for a wide variety of other models of cognition and 
emotion in both academic cognitive psychology and clinical psychology. As such it is 
well-grounded in empirical research, and there is good evidence for the existence of all 
the main components of the model (Power & Dalgleish, 2008).  However, as it is 
relatively new, further research needs to be conducted to clarify the ways in which the 
various processes involved interact with each other (Eysenck & Keane, 2010). The 
implications of this model for the link between imagery and emotion are discussed 
further in 2.4.3.2. 
 
2.3 Psychological research into imagery 
Although mental imagery had long been a source of discussion amongst philosophers, 
Galton (1883) is commonly credited with one of the earliest attempts to study imagery 
in a systematic manner. He asked scientific colleagues and friends a series of open-
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ended questions on visualising and found that the answers revealed marked individual 
differences in the strength and quality of people‟s reported mental imagery. 
Furthermore, a proportion of people (12 per cent) reported that they did not experience 
mental imagery at all. Although during the behaviourist era research into mental 
imagery fell out of fashion because of its reliance on introspective evidence, it re-
emerged with the cognitive revolution. Individual differences in mental imagery use, 
nature and quality were investigated, with imagery vividness receiving the most 
research attention. A number of studies, for example, found that people who score 
highly on measures of imagery vividness have significantly better memory for pictorial 
stimuli (Marks, 1972).  
 
As previously discussed, research into imagery as a phenomenon in its own right was 
questioned (by, for example, Pylyshyn) and defended (by, for example, Paivio) in the 
analogical-propositional debate. Another famous imagery researcher, Stephen Kosslyn, 
took a slightly different approach from Allan Paivio. Kosslyn (e.g. 1975; 2001; 2006) 
proposed that information is stored permanently (in long term memory) in propositional 
form, however imagery experiences are generated from this amodal database when 
specific modal processes are implemented (for example, tasks which require mental 
rotation will elicit imagery). Thus images need to be investigated in their own right, as 
genuine forms of mental representation that cannot be reduced to other functional forms 
of representation (Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977). Accordingly, in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, cognitive science researchers amassed a wealth of studies which 
explored the structure of imagery through experimentation with, for example, mental 
rotation (e.g. Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and image scanning 
(e.g. Kosslyn et al., 1978). 
 
2.3.1 Physiological effects of imagery 
Psychologists have also explored the effect of mental imagery on physiological and 
immune system functioning, with evidence from a range of researchers indicating that 
self-generated mental imagery has a number of objectively measureable physiological 
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effects. Deschaumes-Molinaro et al. (1992) investigated autonomic nervous system 
(ANS) functions (skin potential and resistance, skin temperature and blood flow, heart 
rate) in a group of marksmen and archers. The participants were asked to visualise a 
shooting sequence and two neutral imagery scenes, additionally their ANS functions 
were also measured during actual shooting practice. The results indicated that the 
shooting imagery resulted in more ANS activity than the neutral imagery and 
furthermore ANS responses were the same for the visualisation of the shooting 
sequence as for when the participants were actually engaged in this activity. Other 
studies have found that imagery of appealing food can increase salivary flow (Barber et 
al., 1964; Wooley & Wooley, 1973), and instructions to imagine that specific skin 
regions are hotter or colder can change blood flow (Kunzendorf, 1981; McGuirk et al., 
1998). Physically or emotionally arousing imagery results in increased heart rate (e.g. 
Carroll et al., 1982; Deschaumes-Molinaro et al., 1992; Kunzendorf et al., 1997), with 
relaxing imagery being found to decrease heart rate (Arabian, 1982). In clinical settings, 
long-term reductions in both systolic and diastolic blood pressure have been achieved 
through relaxing imagery (Crowther, 1983). It must be noted however, that the effects 
of the relaxing imagery are not easily disentangled from the effects of the relaxation 
procedure itself, namely sitting comfortably and slowing down breathing rate. Some 
research has found that self-generated images of emotional and bodily arousal can 
increase galvanic skin response (Passchier & Helm-Hylkema, 1981), with one study 
also revealing that the strength of this increase is positively correlated with imagery 
vividness (Drummond et al., 1978). 
 
A number of studies have examined immune system functioning and imagery, for 
example Schneider et al. (1990) found that in healthy subjects‟ immune system 
functioning (as indicated by neutrophil adherence) was improved by images of „white 
blood cells attacking germs‟. Other research with cancer patients has found that the 
likelihood of remission can be improved by mental images of tumours being absorbed 
or attacked by white blood cells (Gruber et al., 1993). With students preparing for 
exams, Gruzelier et al. (2001) compared self-hypnosis training which included imagery 
connected to the immune system or relaxation-based imagery. The training was 
delivered in three weekly group sessions and the researchers found that the students in 
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the immune-system imagery group had fewer viral illnesses during the exam period 
than those in the relaxation-imagery group. However, many of these experimental 
studies conducted with student populations have very short contact periods with no 
follow-up, and so the changes seen may not be maintained in the long-term (Bakke et 
al., 2002).  
 
For some of these studies, the methodological rigorousness is questionable. 
Additionally, as negative results are not often published, conclusions drawn from this 
body of research should be tentative. However, overall it would appear that deliberate 
manipulation of mental imagery has the ability to have a significant effect on a number 
of physiological parameters (Sheikh, 2003) and perhaps therefore also chronic pain 
experiences.  
 
2.4 Is there a special relationship between imagery and 
emotion?  
In both experimental and clinical psychology it is common to find assumptions about 
imagery and emotion being closely connected, although this claim is often based on 
anecdotal reports of clinical observations rather than rigorous research evidence 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005, 2010; Watts, 1997). The experimental and clinical evidence 
for a special relationship existing between imagery and emotion will now be reviewed, 
along with some exploration of potential reasons for such a relationship existing.  
 
2.4.1 Experimental evidence 
Vrana et al. (1986) gave 64 undergraduates written descriptions of fearful or neutral 
events and asked them to silently read them to themselves and then imagine the events. 
They found that their participants‟ heart rates accelerated more for the fearful events 
than the neutral ones but more importantly that this difference was greater when they 
were imaging the event compared to silently verbally rehearsing it. Similarly, Miller et 
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al., (1987) found that (self-rated) „good imagers‟ displayed greater physiological 
activity than „poor imagers‟ when imaging emotional events. Other experimental 
evidence has found that, in comparison to verbal processing and focussing on the 
meaning of fictional described events, instructions to participants to use imagery 
amplifies emotional responses for both negative  (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) and 
positive (Holmes et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2006) affect. 
 
However, in all of the studies cited thus far, the participants (necessarily) had to first 
verbally process the material by reading or listening to it before using imagery, which 
makes comparisons problematic. It could be argued that the emotion in the imagery 
conditions resulted from both verbal and imaginal processing, whereas only verbal 
processing occurs in verbal conditions. This difficulty was overcome, however, in a 
study by Holmes et al. (2008) by the use of a slightly different experimental 
methodology. In this study, participants were presented with pictures and single word 
captions and asked to combine them using either an image or a verbal statement. The 
pictures and captions alone were relatively neutral but their combination would result in 
an affective response (for example, a picture of the view from a high bridge with the 
caption „leap‟). The researchers found, as expected, that state anxiety increased when 
participants were asked to use images as compared to verbal statements to combine the 
pictures and captions. 
 
Experimental research has also found a link between imagery vividness and 
emotionality. Bywaters et al. (2004a) asked 80 undergraduate students to form a mental 
image of 25 pictures from the International Affective Picture System, and found that 
slides previously rated as extremely emotionally valenced (both positive and negative) 
and highly arousing were more vividly imaged than neutral slides. This effect was most 
pronounced when the recall occurred 15 minutes after the presentation of the pictures, 
and still evident after a one week delay (although the study only managed to retain 46 
per cent of the original sample). Additionally, one study found that the number of 
aversions reported by 348 university students was correlated with their imaginal ability, 
i.e. the degree to which they could generate and manipulate vivid and realistic images 
(Dadds et al., 2004).  
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2.4.2 Imagery as part of psychological disorder 
2.4.2.1 Anxiety disorders 
Hackmann and Holmes (2004) claim that the appraisal of intrusive imagery and 
consequential behaviour intended to reduce the perceived threat is key in the 
maintenance of several anxiety disorders. The imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) has been the most extensively studied. A cardinal feature of PTSD is the 
persistent re-experiencing of a traumatic event, commonly as intrusive images 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). These so-called „flashbacks‟ result in a 
powerful anxiety response (Andrews et al., 2003), again suggesting a close link between 
imagery and emotion. The images are considered to be meaningful fragments of a 
trauma memory that lack adequate contextual information, are retrieved from memory 
unintentionally, and contain important meanings related to themes of threat and 
helplessness (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). One very influential theoretical model in the 
literature on PTSD was developed by Brewin et al. (1996a). They suggested that there 
are two levels of representation, verbally accessible memories (VAMs) and situationally 
accessible memories (SAMs). The authors propose that flashbacks occur because of the 
activation of SAM representations. The distinction between the verbal encoding in 
VAMs and the occurrence of flashbacks as a result of SAMs again suggests a verbal-
imaginal distinction with imaginal consequences being closely connected to the 
emotional arousal experienced. The first line evidence-based interventions 
recommended in clinical practice guidelines for PTSD are Trauma-Focused CBT and 
EMDR (NICE, 2005). Both of these utilise imaginal exposure, in recognition of the 
importance of imagery in the maintenance of this condition. 
 
Although less extensively studied than imagery in PTSD, images of the self containing 
both visual and auditory information are thought to be a key component in social phobia 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Hirsch & Clark, 2007). These images are triggered by the 
perception of threat in social situations, are seen from an observer perspective and 
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distorted in several characteristic ways (for example, people imagining themselves as 
trembling more or a brighter shade of red than they actually are). A number of studies 
have found evidence for the existence of these images (Hackmann et al., 1998; Hirsch et 
al., 2003; Hirsch et al., 2004). Furthermore, effective therapeutic interventions have 
been devised which are primarily based on imagery-rescripting (Wild et al., 2008) or 
target self imagery modification within cognitive therapy (Clark et al., 2006). 
 
Imagery is also thought to play a key role in generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), with 
verbal worrying and rumination being used to inhibit aversive emotional imagery of 
negative outcomes (and associated somatic sensations) which would otherwise intrude 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Borkovec et al. (1998) propose that thinking about an 
emotional topic in verbal thoughts results in a drop in physiological response and 
inhibition of emotional processing, whereas the translation of the concern into an image 
will increase physiological response in the short term but ultimately facilitate successful 
processing and resolution of the worry and associated emotion. Characteristic imagery 
has also been identified in agoraphobia (Day et al., 2004) and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Rachman, 2007; Speckens et al., 2007), with images being automatically 
triggered and often incorporating aspects of upsetting memories that carry important 
meanings (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004).  
 
Evidence has also been found which suggests that people who have snake and spider 
phobias experience imagery related to their fear (Hunt et al., 2006; Pratt et al., 2004). 
One study (Hunt & Fenton, 2007) attempted to improve the efficacy of in vivo exposure 
for snake fear by combining it with cognitive therapy methods which included imagery 
rescripting. The imagery rescripting involved the participants (52 students with self-
reported snake fear) identifying and then modifying their frightening snake-related 
imagery by, for example, picturing the snake with no teeth or imagining that they were 
wrapped in protective body armour. Although the addition of cognitive therapy to in 
vivo exposure did not statistically significantly improve the outcomes, cognitive therapy 
alone was as effective as in vivo exposure alone, with all active treatments found to be 
more effective than a relaxation control (Hunt & Fenton, 2007). The power of imagery 
has long been used in systematic desensitisation methods [first described by Wolpe 
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(1958)] which are commonly used to treat phobias and other anxiety conditions. 
Patients are encouraged to imagine their feared object or situation for a long enough 
time that a reduction in the anxiety generated by the image occurs (habituation and 
extinction), and a number of studies have supported the effectiveness of this approach 
(Andrews et al., 2003).  
 
2.4.2.2 Mood and other psychological disorders 
Mansell and Lam (2004) found that in people with remitted unipolar and bipolar 
depression, specific memories in particular are associated with imagery. However, a 
number of memory studies have indicated that people with depression have difficulty in 
recalling specific memories (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Scott, 1988)  
and this overgeneral memory bias is thought to be a maintenance factor for depression 
as it is associated with poor problem solving (Scott et al., 2000). Taken as a whole this 
would appear to suggest that people with depression are less likely to experience vivid 
imagery related to memories. When asked to intentionally recall and rate the vividness 
of emotionally valenced images however, vividness ratings increase with increasing 
depressive symptoms (as indicated by BDI scores), even after imagery ability is 
controlled for (Bywaters et al., 2004a). The apparent confliction between these results 
could be accounted for by the fact that the researchers employed very different 
methodologies. The studies cited first were investigating naturally occurring imagery 
from patients‟ memories rather than intentionally introducing images by asking 
participants to remember them. This difference is clearly an important one, and it could 
be hypothesised that people with depression avoid specific imagery based memories 
because they are too vivid and distressing (similar to the imagery avoidance seen in 
GAD). A study by Brewin et al. (1998) lends some support to this hypothesis. These 
researchers found that in cancer patients, depression severity was related to the 
frequency of intrusive memories and the level of avoidance of them. However, this is 
correlational data, and causality between imagery vividness, imagery avoidance and 
depressive symptomatology remains unclear. 
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Research into intrusive memories in people with depression suggests that they are 
similar in frequency and other characteristics to the intrusive memories in PTSD 
(Brewin et al., 1996b), and may play a significant role in maintaining depressive 
symptoms (Patel et al., 2007). These memories are more likely to be negative in people 
with depression (Bywaters et al., 2004b) and often have particular themes including 
instances of the person being told that they are a failure as well as the recall of past 
depressive episodes (Mansell & Lam, 2004). Consequently there has been some initial 
exploration of the potential application of rescripting techniques with depressive 
intrusive sensory memories (Brewin et al., 2009; Wheatley et al., 2007). This research 
has indicated that imagery rescripting as a stand alone treatment with people who have 
severe and recurrent depression shows promise, furthermore gains were maintained at 
one-year follow-up (Brewin et al., 2009). However, these two studies only involved 
twelve individuals in total and so clearly more controlled and comparative research 
needs to be conducted before imagery rescripting is established as an effective 
intervention.  
 
Clinical practice guidelines for depression recommend CBT as an evidence based 
treatment (NICE, 2009; SIGN, 2010). Although in the past, cognitive therapy has been 
criticised for focusing almost exclusively on language-based mental representation, the 
founder, Aaron T Beck, stated that cognitions relevant to psychological distress can take 
the form of both verbal thoughts and mental images (Beck, 1976) and that modifying 
upsetting visual cognitions can lead to significant emotional shifts (Beck et al., 1985). 
Furthermore, as indicated by clinical texts, clinicians utilising cognitive therapy have 
used mental imagery techniques for some time. However, from the predominant focus 
on verbal representations in the literature it is clear that the science of imagery has 
significantly lagged behind the cognitive therapists‟ clinical creativity. 
 
Other psychological disorders in which characteristic mental images have been found 
include bulimia nervosa (Somerville et al., 2007), psychosis (Morrison, 2004; Morrison 
et al., 2002) and body dysmorphic disorder (Osman et al., 2004). Nelson and Harvey 
(2002) conducted an interesting study with students who experienced sleep-onset 
insomnia. They told participants before they got into bed that they would have to give a 
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speech the following day which would be videotaped and marked for performance. 
They were instructed to think about the speech and its implications when in bed in 
either images or verbal thought. The researchers found that students in the image group 
reported more distress and arousal before going to sleep than those in the verbal group. 
However, in comparison to the verbal group, the next day the image group estimated 
that they fell asleep more quickly and reported less anxiety about giving the speech. 
Thus although it appeared that imagery instructions initially resulted in higher 
emotional distress, in terms of the successful management of a stressful situation it was 




In summary, imagery (and its avoidance) appears to play an important role in the 
development and maintenance of a number of psychological disorders. Furthermore, 
imagery techniques can be powerfully utilised within traditional behavioural therapy 
exposure based interventions for anxiety (Wolpe, 1958). Additionally, imagery 
rescripting methods (as a component of cognitive therapy) which encompass both 
modification of the image itself as well as its implicational meaning and associated 
appraisals, are growing in popularity and show some promise (Holmes et al., 2007; 
Holmes & Mathews, 2010). The body of work reviewed here suggests that in a range of 
psychological disorders, characteristic imagery can be closely connected to emotion.  
 
2.4.3 Reasons why a special relationship might exist 
2.4.3.1 Imagery and perception 
One suggestion as to why imagery and emotion are so closely connected is that the 
same brain systems are involved in processing the emotional aspects of imagery as 
would be utilised if the events were being directly perceived. This is vividly illustrated 
in PTSD, where flashbacks can be experienced and responded to (emotionally, 
physically and behaviourally) as if the trauma is actually happening again. In terms of 
35 
visual images, there is evidence from a number of neuroimaging studies which supports 
this view (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Furthermore, mental images appear to share 
properties with perceptual representations derived from direct sensory experience 
(Kosslyn et al., 2001). From an evolutionary perspective it would be reasonable to 
assume that imaginal processing is more closely linked to emotions than verbal 
processing because basic emotions preceded the development of language-like 
representational systems (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Similarly, developmentally 
speaking, our visual perceptual system develops much more rapidly and at an earlier age 
than we can even understand verbal utterances.  
 
2.4.3.2 SPAARS 
Using the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008), emotional systems might 
be particularly sensitive to imagery as compared to verbal representations because 
cognitions at the propositional level of meaning are not directly linked with emotion. 
However, imagery can directly access the schematic level and hence may have greater 
impact on emotion (route one). Both words and images could also lead to emotion 
through route two through classical conditioning. Imagery in particular is thought to be 
able to function as an unconditioned or conditioned stimulus (Dadds et al., 1997; 2004). 
This fact underlies the theoretical rationale for the use of imaginal exposure in 
systematic desensitisation (Wolpe, 1958) (discussed in section 2.4.2.1). 
 
2.4.3.3 Images and autobiographical memory 
Imagery is thought to be central to autobiographical memory (Conway, 1990; Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This assertion is supported by a variety of evidence, 
including some studies which have compared verbal and imaginal conditions in the 
creation of false memories (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). For example, Hyman and 
Pentland (1996) found that false childhood events were more likely to be recalled later 
if participants had been asked to form a mental image of the event than if they had been 
asked just to „think about it‟. Holmes and Mathews (2010) propose that if the generation 
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of imagery draws on autobiographical memory, then this process may naturally evoke 
the emotions which were experienced at the time the memory was encoded. In the 
second part of the experiment by Holmes et al. (2008) described earlier, participants 
were asked to describe their image or descriptive sentence which had been used to 
combine the picture and caption. Content analysis by independent raters indicated that 
the descriptions provided by people in the imagery condition were more likely to 
include more specific events, involve the self and use more words describing emotions 
and sensations. In contrast, participants in the verbal condition constructed sentences 
which had less personal and emotional impact because they were constructed from 
generic semantic knowledge. For example: 
 
„In response to a picture of someone swimming in the sea and the caption 
“race”, an imagery condition participant said “Swimming in the sea, very, very 
cold, racing with other people coming up behind me” while another in the 
verbal condition said “The swimmer was having difficulty finishing the race 
across the channel”.‟ (Holmes et al., 2008, p.404) 
 
This provides support to the hypothesis that access to autobiographical memory may 
partially mediate the emotional effects of imagery 
 
2.4.4 Summary 
Imagery and its avoidance appear to play a significant role in emotional disorders; 
additionally, growing experimental evidence indicates that imagery is closely linked to 
emotion. The reason for this close relationship could be understood with reference to a 
multi-level theory of emotion, SPAARS, through the exploration of the overlap between 
imagery and direct perception as well as its link with autobiographical memory. Given 
the importance of emotional factors in chronic pain, a potentially significant area of 
exploration would be the link between emotions and chronic pain imagery. Although 
thus far there has been limited examination of this, Chapter 3 reviews the relevant 
literature in this area.
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Chapter 3: Imagery in Chronic Pain 
 
The overwhelming majority of research which has investigated imagery in chronic 
pain has examined the effectiveness of guided imagery techniques for the reduction 
of pain. There are also a few isolated descriptions of imagery modification 
techniques which target naturally-occurring mental imagery associated with pain, 
and two (currently unpublished) studies which have explored the nature and 
functional impact of specific chronic pain imagery (Gosden, 2008; Potter, 2007). 
Chapter 3 will review each of these areas in turn and in so doing provide the 
justification for the present study.  
 
3.1 Imagery-based interventions for chronic pain 
The most commonly cited use for imagery is for the intentional generation of 
pleasant images to aid relaxation and divert attention away from pain (see 3.1.1). 
However, it should be noted that imagery has also been used in other idiosyncratic 
ways such as transforming the pain sensation itself (for example imagining the pain 
is tingling or numbness) or transforming the interpretation of pain sensations (for 
example imagining being a spy or Olympic athlete who continues on despite being 
injured) (Pincus & Sheikh, 2009; Turk et al., 1983).  
 
3.1.1 Guided relaxation or pleasant imagery 
Guided imagery involves a client being taught to evoke a mental image which has 
relaxing or soothing qualities (Horan et al., 1976). The images can be generated by 
the client or they can be described by the therapist. A self-generated image could, for 
example, be prompted through a suggestion to think of „a beautiful place‟ and 
connect with all the sensory aspects of that place. A therapist-guided image could be 
evoked through a sensory-rich description of, for example, a beach scene (Field & 
Swarm, 2008). The beneficial effects of this method for pain relief are thought to be 
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both the result of the physiological effect of imagery (see 2.3.1) as well as the fact 
that the self-generation and maintenance of pleasant or relaxing imagery is very 
attentionally demanding and so provides an effective distraction from the pain 
(James, 1992a; Skevington, 1995).   
 
In a meta-analysis of 51 studies (involving more than 2000 participants) which 
examined the effectiveness of cognitive strategies to alter pain perception, using 
pleasant and neutral imagery was found to be the most effective at changing pain 
tolerance, threshold, and intensity (Fernandez & Turk, 1989). However, the majority 
of the studies reviewed examined acute pain in laboratory conditions and so the 
conclusions cannot necessarily be generalised to chronic pain. More recent clinically-
based studies have indicated that guided imagery can be effective in reducing the 
pain associated with cancer (Keefe et al., 2010; Sloman, 1995) as well as 
perioperative (Rampkin et al., 1991; Tusek et al., 1997) and postoperative (Huth et 
al., 2004) acute pain symptoms. 
 
In terms of chronic pain, numerous widely available chronic pain treatment guides 
recommend the use of relaxation imagery techniques (Otis, 2007; Thorn, 2004), and 
there is evidence from a number of studies that guided imagery can improve 
outcomes for people with chronic pain. For example, Turner and Jensen (1993) 
found that a combination of guided imagery and progressive muscular relaxation 
(PMR) were as effective as cognitive therapy at reducing pain intensity ratings in a 
sample of people with chronic low back pain. In fact, the addition of cognitive 
techniques to the PMR and guided imagery did not improve the effectiveness, as was 
also found by (Syrjala et al., 1995) in a controlled trail with patients with cancer 
pain. 
 
In a well designed and implemented study with women with a diagnosis of 
fibromyalgia, Fors et al. (2002) investigated the effectiveness of amitriptyline and 
two different guided imagery conditions (which included music and relaxation) on 
daily visual analogue scale ratings of pain intensity. Fifty-five women were 
randomised to either pleasant imagery, attention imagery (which involved focussing 
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on the „active works of the internal pain and control systems‟
1
) or a control group 
(treatment as usual). The participants were also randomly assigned to 50 mg per day 
of amitriptyline or a placebo. The results indicated that, in comparison to the control 
group, pain intensity decreased for the women in the pleasant imagery group but not 
the attention imagery group. There was no main effect or interaction effect of 
amitriptyline. As the study design utilised an alternative imagery intervention which 
did not prove to be effective, we can confidently conclude that the improvement seen 
for the pleasant imagery group was due to the nature of the imagery and not the 
interventions‟ generic relaxation and musical component. Unfortunately however, 
the study only collected data over a period of a month and so it is unclear whether the 
improvements seen were maintained. Guided imagery interventions have also 
resulted in improvements in pain ratings in a heterogeneous clinical sample from a 
chronic pain clinic (Lewandowski, 2004) as well as people with osteoarthritis (Baird 
& Sands, 2006), headache (Mannix et al., 1999) and children with recurrent 
abdominal pain (Weydert et al., 2006). 
 
Taken together, these results indicate that the use of pleasant or relaxing guided 
imagery techniques can be effective in reducing pain and improving outcomes not 
only for experimentally induced and acute pain but also some chronic pain 
conditions. However, the methodological quality is poor in some of the studies and in 
many of them the use of imagery has been combined with general relaxation 
instructions or hypnosis and so the relative contributions of these elements is hard to 
determine. Overall however, it appears that guided imagery can result in at least short 
term reductions in acute and chronic pain although the long term effectiveness of this 
technique for chronic pain is yet to be established.  
 
                                                 
1
 This involved participants visualising their own pain-alleviating biological systems, with audiotapes 
providing descriptions of how endorphins and inhibitory neurons act to limit pain. 
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3.1.2 Pain imagery modification 
None of the imagery techniques referred to in the previous section have utilised 
people‟s naturally occurring mental images, although, for example, large catalogues 
of artwork (Padfield et al., 2003; www.painexhibit.com) would suggest that visual 
imagery is, at the very least, a powerful medium through which pain can be 
expressed and explored (Henare et al., 2003). Self help guides for chronic pain 
management often refer to imaginal methods which describe, for example, 
„visualisation techniques to obtain an image of the pain itself and then change it to 
one more tolerable‟ (Sadler, 2007, p.65). Furthermore, clinical guides for health 
practitioners frequently contain references to (and scripts for) helping patients 
identify and then change their own pain imagery (Field & Swarm, 2008; Pincus & 
Sheikh, 2009). Pincus et al. (2004a) describe what they term „deep imagery‟ 
techniques which have been used for spiritual and physical healing for centuries by 
Buddhist healers and shamanistic practitioners. These include transformational 
methods of changing the size, colour or location of their pain, dissociating from a 
symbolic representation of the pain or otherwise changing their relationship to the 
mental image, for example by viewing it from a distance (Pincus et al., 2004a).  
 
However, imagery techniques centred on manipulating naturally occurring 
spontaneous images of pain appear to have been neglected in the scientific research 
outcome literature. Currently, there is very little rigorous scientific research 
published in mainstream clinical journals which indicates that these techniques are 
effective. This has perhaps happened because of the idiosyncratic nature of imagery 
as well as imagery transformation techniques having Eastern spiritual and new-age 
origins. This lack of research is unfortunate given the potential power of the 
manipulation of imagery to help people with chronic pain articulate and modify 
beliefs and feelings related to their pain which are less readily accessible via verbal 
cognitive techniques (Gosden, 2008).  
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3.2 Spontaneously occurring imagery in chronic pain 
It is surprising that the naturally occurring imagery associated with pain has thus far 
received little research attention, although perhaps given that mental imagery is 
becoming one of the „„hot topics‟‟ in modern cognitive behaviour therapy (Holmes et 
al., 2007), this will not remain the case. Everyday language used to describe pain 
often refers to what could be considered imaginal descriptors, for example „burning‟, 
„stabbing‟, „squeezing‟ (Craig, 2005). Furthermore, clinical anecdote indicates that 
people who experience chronic pain often spontaneously offer imagery-like 
descriptions of their pain, or indeed overtly report experiencing a mental image.  
 
To date there have been two key pieces of (currently unpublished) work which have 
explored the nature and functional impact of naturally occurring chronic pain mental 
images. Potter (2007) conducted a questionnaire study and received 83 responses 
from a heterogeneous sample of people presenting to a chronic pain clinic. When 
asked the question: „Some people report having a mental image and/or pictures of 
their pain, do you have these?‟ (Potter, 2007, p.41), a significant proportion (23 per 
cent) of the respondents said yes. On further exploration, the results indicated that 
reporting chronic pain images was associated with higher anxiety, depression and 
catastrophising but not greater pain, disability or other psychological factors 
(including acceptance, resourcefulness, coping thoughts and helplessness). However, 
as only 19 of the respondents indicated that they did experience a mental image, the 
between group comparisons (imagers vs. non-imagers) were underpowered and 
therefore may have missed effects. Furthermore, the way the question about pain 
imagery was asked limited it to only visual pain images rather than also 
encompassing other sensory modalities.  
 
Nevertheless, these were significant findings, and subsequently Gosden (2008) 
further explored this phenomenon through another questionnaire study which 
examined the characteristics and nature of the chronic pain images. From his 
heterogeneous sample of 105 people from a specialist chronic pain clinic, 39 per cent 
reported experiencing a mental image of their pain. The large difference between this 
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and the proportion found by Potter (2007) is attributable to the slightly different 
question asked in this study, which enquired about mental imagery in all sensory 
modalities rather than just visual:  
 
„We are particularly interested in finding out if you have a picture or a 
mental image of what your pain is like. A mental image is like having a 
picture in your head which may include things you can imagine seeing, 
hearing or feeling‟ (Gosden, 2008, p.90) 
 
Similar to Potter (2007), Gosden (2008) also found that people who reported having 
a mental image also reported significantly higher levels of depression, and although 
there was also a trend toward higher anxiety in the imagers group, the difference was 
not statistically significant. This different finding for anxiety was potentially because 
of the measure used, as Potter (2007) measured anxiety and depressive 
symptomatology with the hospital anxiety and depression scale (HADS, Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983) whereas Gosden (2008) used the depression, anxiety and positive 
outlook scale (DAPOS, Pincus et al., 2004b). As the DAPOS employs only three 
items to measure anxiety, it is potentially less sensitive.  
 
Gosden (2008) found that imagers rated their pain as more unpleasant than non-
imagers, despite reporting the same level of pain intensity. The questionnaire 
responses also indicated that the chronic pain images were distressing, occurred 
frequently (at least every day) and interfered with daily life. A thematic analysis of 
the written descriptions of the pain imagery provided by the imagers was conducted 
and revealed distinct themes. These related to the sensory qualities of the pain, 
individuals‟ beliefs about the physical cause of pain and personal meanings that the 
presence of pain had for the individual, with themes of victimisation or punishment 
most common (Gosden, 2008).  
 
Aside from the questionnaire study, Gosden (2008) also conducted a small number of 
exploratory semi-structured interviews to collect further information about the nature 
of the chronic pain images experienced. The reports of the fourteen participants 
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whose data were retained (as two people interviewed were unable to generate an 
image) indicated that mental images were primarily visual and tactile, although 
auditory, olfactory and taste modalities within imagery were also reported. Images 
were longstanding (having lasted three years on average) and largely stable over 
time. They were most frequently triggered by an increase in pain level, and people‟s 
reported reactions to the image occurring overwhelmingly attempted to avoid, reduce 
or suppress the image in some way.  
 
At the end of the interview, the majority of the participants (86 per cent) reported 
that they had experienced a negative emotional response and an increase in 
physiological arousal (as indicated by self-rated muscular tension, sweatiness, heart 
rate, and breathing rate) while they had their image in mind. Furthermore, they 
reported that their pain intensity had increased. However, these were retrospective 
judgements as the study design did not include before and after rating comparisons.  
 
Taken together, these studies have provided a great deal of novel information about 
the nature of spontaneous naturally occurring chronic pain images as well as the 
factors they are associated with. Some of the results of the interview element of 
Gosden‟s (2008) study are particularly intriguing, given the close connections found 
between imagery and emotion in both experimental research and psychological 
disorder, as discussed in 2.4. This field of research would benefit from a more 
rigorous systematic investigation of the „live‟ emotional and pain intensity 
consequences of evoking chronic pain imagery, which is what this study aims to 
provide.  
 
3.3 Aim of present study 
This research aims to further our understanding of the links between thoughts (both 
word-based and image-based) and emotions in people who report experiencing 
chronic pain-related imagery. The experimental manipulation will aim to (separately) 
directly evoke verbal and imaginal cognitions and measure the effects of these a 
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variety of indices; specifically the intensity of perceived pain and strength of 
emotional response. These experimental conditions will be compared to baseline 
ratings.  
 
Additionally, it will examine the nature of the imagery described by the participants, 
namely how often they experience the image, how vivid it is, how distressing or 
pleasant it is, how much it interferes with daily life, and how much they can control 
it. These variables will also be examined in relation to the level of overall 
psychological distress (anxiety and depression symptoms) reported by the 





Hypothesis 1: There will be a difference in the reported pain intensity (1a) and 
strength of emotions [fear (1b), sadness (1c), anger (1d), disgust (1e), and happiness 
(1f)] between the baseline and the experimental conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a difference in the reported pain intensity (2a) and 
strength of emotions [fear (2b), sadness (2c), anger (2d), disgust (2e), and happiness 
(2f)] between the imaginal and verbal conditions.  
 
3.4.2 Secondary 
Hypothesis 3: Positive correlations will exist between imagery frequency, distress 
and interference. Negative correlations will exist between pain imagery 
controllability and imagery frequency, distress and interference.  
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Hypothesis 4: Less controllable, more frequently occurring, more distressing and 
more interfering images will be associated with higher levels of self-reported anxiety 
and depression.  
 
Hypothesis 5: People who have more spontaneous and more vivid general everyday 
images will also experience pain images which are less controllable, occur more 
frequently, are more distressing and more interfering. 
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Chapter 4: Method 
4.1 Stage one: Recruitment 
4.1.1 Recruitment 
A postal questionnaire design was used to recruit potential participants to the study. 
  
4.1.2 Participants 
4.1.2.1 Inclusion criteria 
Potential participants were drawn from a heterogeneous population of chronic pain 
patients attending a chronic pain specialist clinic within a large NHS teaching 
hospital. All people attending this service are age 18 or over and experience a range 
of chronic pain types due to a variety of causes. Patients with cancer-related pain are 
not routinely seen within this service, unless their pain is the result of past surgical or 
medical intervention and they have been successfully treated for the disease. All 
patients who were referred to and attended an initial appointment (normally with a 
Consultant in Pain Medicine and Anaesthesia) within the pain service during the 
period January 2009 – December 2009 (inclusive) were contacted. 
 
4.1.2.2 Exclusion criteria 
Anyone who had received or was receiving psychology input from the experimenter 
or another qualified or trainee clinical psychologist within the pain service was 
excluded in order to avoid the possibility that they might feel pressure to take part. 
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4.1.2.3 Sample size 
According to calculations detailed further below (see 4.2.2.3), a minimum of 34 
experiment interview participants were needed from the recruitment stage. On the 
basis of response rates to other postal research in this field (Gosden, 2008; Potter, 
2007) it was estimated that between 20 and 25 per cent of people would return their 
brief questionnaire. On the basis of previous research (Gosden, 2008) it was 
estimated that of these, approximately 20 per cent would meet criteria for the 
experiment interview and would consent to take part. Therefore, it was calculated 
that between 680 and 850 packs would need to be sent out. In 2009, 853 new 
appointments were attended within the pain service. Of these, 27 people had received 
or were receiving psychology input and therefore 826 packs were posted out.  
 
4.1.3 Procedure 
Potential participants were identified from pain service 2009 electronic patient lists. 
They were sent a letter (see Error! Reference source not found.) from the clinical 
leader of the pain service (a Consultant in Pain Medicine and Anaesthesia) with a 
brief questionnaire (see Error! Reference source not found.) to their home address, 
inviting them to take part in the study. Also enclosed in the envelope were a 
participant information sheet (see Error! Reference source not found.) and a 
stamped return envelope. As an incentive to increase the return rate, all participants 
who returned their questionnaire and indicated they wished to be included were 
entered into a prize draw for a £25 shopping voucher. The funding for this was 
provided by the University of Edinburgh.  
 
The brief questionnaire asked participants to describe their pain, its location, duration 
and cause (if known). Mental images or mental imagery were not mentioned in the 
title of the questionnaire, the invitation letter, or the participant information sheet in 
order to avoid possible contamination of participants‟ initial description of their pain 
and to reduce the effects of suggestibility on participants‟ mental imagery report. On 
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the third page of the questionnaire the participant was asked whether they had a 
mental image of their pain using the following question (taken from Gosden, 2008):  
 
„We are particularly interested in finding out if you have a picture or a 
mental image of what your pain is like. A mental image is like having a 
picture in your head which may include things you can imagine seeing, 
hearing or feeling. Do you ever have a mental image like this of your pain?‟ 
 
If they indicated that they did experience an image of this nature they were asked to 
briefly describe it. Finally, they were asked to provide contact details if they were 
willing to discuss taking part in an individual interview.  
 
4.2 Stage two: Experiment interview 
4.2.1 Design 
A within subjects or repeated measures design was utilised with each participant 
being asked to describe their pain in two different ways. In the verbal condition they 
were asked to describe their pain using single descriptive words and in the imaginal 
condition they were asked to evoke and describe their pain imagery. The dependent 
variables were their rating of their pain intensity and ratings of the strength of their 
emotions. These were assessed using visual analogue scales in a questionnaire 




Potential participants identified during stage one recruitment were selected for the 
experiment interview using the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined below.  
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4.2.2.1 Inclusion criteria 
 NHS patients who were referred to and attended an initial appointment within 
the pain service during the period January 2009 – December 2009
1
. 
 Aged 18 or over1. 








 Reported experiencing a mental image of their pain2.  
 Consented to take part in an interview3. 
 
4.2.2.2 Exclusion criteria 
 Any patient who had received or was receiving psychology input from the 




 Anyone who provided an ambiguous description of their pain imagery2. Gosden 
(2008) identified a small group of participants within his sample who reported 
pain imagery, but the written descriptions provided were unclear and did not 
appear to actually describe imagery phenomena. As this had potentially arisen 
from a misunderstanding of the question, it was decided that only people who 
provided unambiguous descriptions of their imagery would be contacted for 
interview.  
 Any patient who the medical team within the pain service raised concerns about 
taking part in an interview. The names of potential interview participants were 
shared with the team to check whether they were individuals who were likely to 
become overly distressed by the interview (on the basis of previous clinical 
interviews).  
                                                 
1 
Criteria identified at stage one recruitment 
2
 Criteria identified from responses on brief questionnaire 
3
 Criteria identified during phone call to discuss interview appointment 
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 Anyone who disclosed a current or previous diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD)
2
. These individuals were excluded as intrusive imagery or 
flashbacks are a characteristic part of PTSD and happen when the person re-
experiences the traumatic event. This is imagery of a different nature to that 
which this study is interested in, furthermore if the experiment interview 
triggered this imagery it would be extremely distressing for the participant. 
 Anyone who disclosed a current or previous diagnosis of psychosis2. Again, the 
imagery characteristic of this condition (hallucination) is of a different nature to 
that in which this study is interested.  
 Anyone who identified themselves as having had therapeutic input involving 
imagery techniques
3
. These individuals were excluded as any previous 
experience of recalling and manipulating pain related imagery could be a 
confounding factor as this study is interested in the spontaneous, naturally 
occurring pain images. 
 
4.2.2.3 Sample size 
Statistical power is the ability of a test to detect an effect in a sample where one 
exists within the population. Power calculations can be conducted to determine the 
minimum sample size necessary to achieve a certain level of power given an 
estimated effect size and (the conventional) significance α-level of p < .05. Cohen 
(1992) suggests that we would hope to have a .2 probability of failing to detect a 
genuine effect (Type II error), and so recommends a power of at least .8.  
 
For the present research, the minimum required sample size calculation was based on 
the primary hypotheses, which employs a repeated measures or within groups design. 
The effect size of the experimental manipulation was estimated to be medium to 
large [d = .5 to .8 according to conventions outlined by Cohen (1977)], on the basis 
of the previous work by Gosden (2008) (specific to mental imagery within chronic 
pain) as well as the work of Oxford University‟s imagery research group lead by 
                                                 
2
 Criteria identified from responses on brief questionnaire 
3
 Criteria identified during phone call to discuss interview appointment 
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Emily Holmes (e.g. Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006). According to 
power calculations using G*Power, (Erdfelder et al., 1996), using a repeated 
measures two-tailed t-test with two conditions, 34 experimental interview 
participants were needed to achieve .8 power assuming a medium effect size (d = .5) 
and p < .05. 
 
4.2.2.4 Participant characteristics 
Figure 2 overleaf presents an overview of the flow of participants throughout the 
study. Of the 826 brief questionnaire packs posted out 184 were returned, 
representing a response rate of 22 per cent. Of these, 42 per cent of people reported 
experiencing a mental image of their pain (N = 78).  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental sample and recruitment sample 
(including those who were also in the experimental sample) participant 
characteristics. The information collected on participants‟ pain locations and (self-
reported) cause of pain indicated that both the recruitment and experimental samples 
were heterogeneous groups, reflecting the nature of the chronic pain population seen 
in the specialist clinic.  
 




Recruitment sample  Experimental sample  
 Total N  Total N 
Sex (%) Male 31.0 183 16.7 36 
Female 68.5  83.3  
Age (years) Mean (SD) 53.3 (15.5) 184 53.1 (11.6) 36 
Range 18 – 85  24 – 71  
History of mental 
health problem(s) (%) 
Yes 27.2 182 38.9 36 
No 71.7  61.1  
Pain duration (years) Mean (SD) 10.0 (10.3) 174 11.2 (10.3) 36 
Range 0.67 – 63    0.67 – 40   
Number of pain 
locations  
Mean (SD) 4.9 (3.9) 184 4.4 (3.1) 36 
Range 1 – 16   1 – 14  
 
1 
One experiment interview was not completed because the participant became highly distressed when 
asked to describe their pain imagery. In accordance with ethical duty within research, the interviewer 
therefore terminated the experimental procedure early and instead focussed on comforting the participant 
to help calm them down.          52 
 
Figure 2: Overview of participants 
Referred to Pain Service and attended an 
initial appointment: 853 
Reported pain imagery (imagers): 78 Did not report pain imagery (non-imagers): 
106 
Excluded because had received/was receiving 
psychological input: 27 
Sent an invitation letter and brief 
questionnaire: 826 
Indicated they did not wish to be contacted for 
interview: 23 
Ambiguous response on question which 
required a description of the imagery: 5 
Contacted by telephone to discuss 
experiment interview: 50 
Did not wish to take part in interview: 4 
Excluded as reported previous input involving 
imagery: 3 
Experiment interview appointment made: 
43 
Cancelled or did not attend experiment 
interview: 6 
Attended experiment interview: 37 
Contacted the department to indicate they did 
not wish to participate: 37 
Did not return questionnaire: 605 
Returned brief questionnaire: 184 
Experiment interview terminated early because 
of high distress: 11 
Experiment interview completed: 36 
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The experimental sample was compared to both the remaining recruitment sample 
and the remaining imagers to ascertain how representative the sample was of these 
groups. The experimental sample did not significantly differ from the recruitment 
sample in age, history of mental health problems, duration of pain, number of pain 
locations or knowledge of the cause of their chronic pain. However, the experimental 
sample did contain a significantly higher proportion of females than the recruitment 
sample. The experimental sample did not significantly differ from the rest of the 
imagers in the recruitment sample in terms of sex, history of mental health problems, 
duration of pain, number of pain locations or knowledge of the cause of their chronic 
pain. However, the experimental sample were significantly older than the remaining 
imagers. 
 
The group who reported experiencing pain imagery (henceforth referred to as 
imagers) were compared to those who did not (henceforth referred to as non-
imagers). The imagers did not differ from the non-imagers in sex, duration of chronic 
pain, number of pain locations or whether they knew the cause of the chronic pain. 
However, imagers were younger and had experienced significantly more mental 
health problems than non-imagers. 
 
4.2.3 Procedure 
People who returned their brief questionnaire, reported having mental images associated 
with their pain and opted into the interview study were contacted by telephone by the 
experimenter. They were provided with some basic information about what they could 
expect in the experiment interview and also asked a few questions relating to the 
presence of the exclusion criteria outlined above. They were given the opportunity to 
ask questions about the nature of the research, and also informed that their participation 
was entirely voluntary and they had the right to withdraw at any time and without 
providing a reason. If they were eligible and happy to take part in the experiment, an 
interview appointment was made and they were sent a second participant information 
sheet (see Error! Reference source not found.). They were also asked for their 
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consent for the experimenter to contact their GP to inform them that they would be 
taking part in the study (see Error! Reference source not found.). As an incentive for 
participants to come to a scheduled interview, all participants who attended (whether or 
not they fully completed the experiment) were entered into a second separate prize draw 
for another £25 shopping voucher. The funding for this was provided by the University 
of Edinburgh. Participants were asked whether they wanted to opt into the second draw 
over the phone after they had made the appointment. 
 
At the start of the interview, each participant was asked to read and sign a consent form 
(see Error! Reference source not found.). Each experiment interview (see Error! 
Reference source not found. for the interview schedule) lasted around forty minutes 
and was conducted by the experimenter alone within the pain service hospital clinic. 
After signing the consent form, participants were asked to complete a baseline primary 
questionnaire (see Error! Reference source not found.), described further below. 
Depending on their experimental condition order, following this the participants were 
next either asked to describe their pain to the experimenter using single descriptive 
words (verbal condition) or to evoke and describe their pain imagery (imaginal 
condition). Each condition lasted four minutes (timed by the experimenter) and 
immediately afterwards the participants were again asked to complete the primary 
questionnaire. Half of the participants completed the verbal condition followed by the 
imaginal condition and half vice versa, to control for order effects.  
 
In the verbal condition, participants were asked to list single, stand alone words they 
would use to describe their pain on a piece of paper. If they struggled with generating 
words they were reminded of the first three descriptive words they used on the brief 
questionnaire. Following this they were asked to read out their list and put each word 
into a short sentence to describe their pain (see Error! Reference source not found.). 
If this exercise had not taken four minutes they were further asked to select up to three 
key words from their list which they thought best described their pain. In the imaginal 
condition, participants were asked to recreate their pain image in their mind‟s eye, 
closing their eyes if it helped. If they struggled with this, they were prompted with a 
reminder of their image description on the brief questionnaire. They were asked to 
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describe the image to the experimenter, who also asked open questions about sensory 
modalities, namely sights, sounds, smells, tastes and physical sensations (other than 
pain).  
 
In between the two conditions, the participants were asked to complete four 
straightforward „filler‟ tasks, designed to interrupt any cognitive processing and to 
provide a temporal separation between the experimental conditions. The tasks involved 
generating a list of as many animals as they could think of (within a minute) and listing 
the different uses that a paperclip, brick and newspaper could be put to. These tasks 
were designed to distract them and encourage creative thinking to minimise carryover 
effects between the conditions.  
 
Finally, the participants were asked to complete a secondary questionnaire (detailed 
further below), thanked for their time and given a brief explanation of the aims and 
hypotheses of the study. 
 
4.2.4 Primary measures 
During the experiment interview the participants were asked to complete a primary 
questionnaire (see Error! Reference source not found.) three times, specifically once 
at baseline and then immediately following each of the two experimental conditions.   
 
4.2.4.1 A visual analogue scale rating of pain intensity  
Visual analogue scales (VASs) have been used extensively with both acute and chronic 
pain and provide a reliable and sensitive measure of the intensity of a person‟s 
perceived pain (Tyrer, 1992; Williamson & Hoggart, 2005). Following the instruction 
of „Please mark the line below to indicate how intense your pain has been over the last 
four minutes‟ a 10cm VAS was presented, with a left hand anchor point of „no pain‟ and 
a right hand anchor point of „worst pain imaginable‟. A 10cm length was used for 
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convenience and because this has smaller measurement errors than 5cm or 20cm lengths 
(Seymour et al., 1985). 
 
4.2.4.2 Visual analogue scale ratings of the strength of the five emotions 
As discussed in 2.1.2, research with both clinical and normal population samples across 
a number of cultures has established that there are five basic emotions: sadness, fear, 
anger, disgust and happiness (Power & Dalgleish, 2008). VASs were selected to 
measure the intensity of these emotions at baseline and immediately after the 
experimental conditions as this type of scale is more sensitive to subtle changes in 
emotion which may occur within the short time period employed by this study. The 
order of presentation of the scales was varied, with each participant completing three of 
15 different randomly generated presentation orders of „sad‟, „angry‟, „fearful‟, 
„disgusted‟ and „happy‟. The following instructions were provided: „This scale consists 
of five words which describe different feelings and emotions. Please read each item and 
then mark the line to indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the last four 
minutes.‟ Again, 10cm VASs were used, with the a hand anchor point of „very slightly 
or not at all‟ and a right hand anchor point of „extremely‟.   
 
4.2.4.3 Rating of imagery vividness  
This single item (adapted from The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire) was 
included to provide a measure of condition fidelity, and asked participants to rate the 
vividness of their picture or mental image of what their pain is like. This was to 
ascertain whether the participants experienced a difference in the vividness of their pain 
imagery under the two experimental conditions, and consequently this item did not 
appear on the primary questionnaire completed at baseline.  
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4.2.5 Secondary measures 
At the end of the experimental interview, participants were asked to complete a 
secondary questionnaire pack which was composed of the four measures described 
below. 
 
4.2.5.1 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a measure designed to detect adverse anxiety 
and depressive states. It is a 14 item Likert scale (7 items per subscale) with four 
possible responses on each item. A higher score indicates a greater number of 
symptoms and greater severity of the emotional state. For both scales, a score of 0-7 is 
„normal‟ or below caseness, 8-10 is mild or borderline and 11 or above would imply 
caseness (moderate if 11-14 or severe if 15-21) (Snaith, 2003). The HADS is used 
extensively in clinical practice and research, has established validity and a good factor 
structure, intercorrelation and homogeneity (Bjelland et al., 2002; Bramley et al., 1988; 
Moorey et al., 1991). As it was originally intended for use in non-psychiatric hospital 
departments it does not rely on symptoms which may be present in people with physical 
illness alone (e.g. sleep disturbance, weight loss, pain). A literature review of the HADS 
(Bjelland et al., 2002) found an acceptable average internal reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach‟s alpha) of .83 for the anxiety subscale (range .68 to .93) and .82 for the 
depression subscale (range .67 to .90). In the present study, Cronbach‟s alpha was .79 
for the anxiety subscale and .83 for the depression subscale. 
 
4.2.5.2 Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) (see Error! Reference source not found.) was included to 
provide a measure of general visual imagery ability. It is a 16 item Likert scale in which 
the participant is invited to consider the image formed in thinking about four elements 
of four different scenes, for example „the contours of the landscape‟ in „a country scene 
which involves trees, mountains and a lake‟. The participant is asked to rate the 
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vividness of each image item on a 5 point scale twice, first with their eyes open and 
then with their eyes closed. A total score is calculated (range 32-160); with a lower 
score reflecting better imagery ability. Scores have been found to correlate with 
objective variables such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data on 
activity in the early visual cortex relative to the whole brain (Cui et al., 2007). Marks 
(1973) reports this measure has a test-retest reliability coefficient of .74 (N = 68) and a 
split-half reliability coefficient of .85 (N = 150). Other internal consistency calculations 
have reported acceptable alpha levels ranging from 0.91 to 0.94 (Childers et al., 1985). 
In the present study, Cronbach‟s alpha was .96, however as this measure has a large 
number of questions this calculation of internal reliability should be interpreted with 
caution as it may be misleadingly inflated (Cortina, 1993). However, the VVIQ  is the 
most widely used measure of imagery vividness (McAvinue & Robertson, 2007), with 
factor analysis data indicating that the VVIQ items all load onto a single factor 
(Childers et al., 1985). Overall, the VVIQ  has been established as a reliable and valid 
instrument (Campos, 1995; McKelvie, 1995).  
 
4.2.5.3 Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale 
The SUIS (Reisberg et al., 2003) (see Error! Reference source not found.) is a 12-
item self-report measure of use of imagery in everyday situations. Items such as, „when 
I think about a series of errands I must do, I visualise the stores I will visit.‟ are rated on 
a five-point scale from „never appropriate‟ to „always appropriate‟. A total item score is 
calculated (range 12-60); with a higher number reflecting more frequent use of imagery. 
Reisberg et al. (2003) report an internal consistency coefficient of .98 (N = 150), and in 
the present study the internal reliability (calculated using Cronbach‟s alpha) was .87. 
Although test-retest reliability of this scale has not been established, it has been used in 
imagery research (Holmes et al., 2006; Mast et al., 2003) and it correlates significantly 
with the more established VVIQ (Reisberg et al., 2003). It was included to provide an 
indication of how frequently the participants use imagery in everyday life.  
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4.2.5.4 Custom-designed imagery questionnaire  
As no suitable measure of pain-related mental imagery currently exists, a one-page 
questionnaire with four questions (see Error! Reference source not found.) was 
designed specifically for this study, based on Gosden‟s (2008) questionnaire. The first 
question asked participants to identify how often they experienced the pain image on a 5 
point scale from „many times a day‟ to „almost never‟. 11 point scales were provided for 
the remaining three questions, which asked how distressing or pleasant the image was, 
how much it interfered with daily life and how controllable it was.  
 
4.3 Ethical considerations 
A number of ethical considerations were taken into account in the design of this study.  
 
4.3.1 Informed consent 
With regards to ensuring participants were able to provide informed consent, they 
received information about the study within the participant information sheets enclosed 
with the brief questionnaire and provided before they attended an interview. 
Additionally, they were offered the opportunity to discuss the study and ask questions 
of the experimenter over the telephone and then in person prior to deciding whether to 
take part in an experiment interview. Participants were informed at several stages of this 
process that their participation was entirely voluntary, and that they could withdraw 
from the study without giving a reason at any time without negative consequence. 
Interview participants read and signed a written consent form to confirm their awareness 
of these issues. 
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4.3.2 Participant distress 
A further ethical issue that was considered in this study design was the possibility that 
participants might become distressed during interviews as a result of describing their 
pain experience or evoking pain imagery. This issue was discussed with a qualified 
clinical psychologist who supervised the project and it was agreed that the experimenter 
had the appropriate skills and knowledge (developed through training and clinical 
experience of working with distressed individuals) to be able to adequately assess and 
manage such situations. If the experimenter became aware that a participant may have 
been currently experiencing a significant mental health problem they were offered 
appropriate treatment either through the NHS pain service itself or referred to a suitable 
alternative service. A further ethical consideration was the potential that a participant 
might have made a disclosure to the experimenter which had implications for the safety 
of the participant, or the safety of other people. Again, it was agreed that the 
experimenter possessed the suitable risk assessment and management skills to 
appropriately respond to such situations. In order to ensure participants were aware of 
the limits of confidentiality with regards to risk assessment and management, they were 
asked prior to interview to give consent for the experimenter to contact their GP should 
she have any concerns regarding their safety or the safety of others. Additionally, when 
the participants made their interview appointments their GPs were informed by letter of 
the fact that they were due to take part in the research.  
 
4.3.3 Anonymisation of data 
The data collected from each participant during recruitment and the experiment 
interview was anonymised via allocation of an identifier (a number) which was used 
throughout the data collection, summary and analysis. The contact information returned 
on the initial brief questionnaire was detached from the data and shredded once it had 
been used (for the prize draw or to contact the person to discuss an interview). Any 
identifiable information pertaining to the experiment interview participants was stored 
separately from the participant responses, in a secure location (separate to the data 
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itself) and will be destroyed on completion of the project. As an employee of the NHS, 
the experimenter acted in accordance with the NHS Code of Confidentiality. 
 
4.3.4 Ethical approval 
Ethical opinion for this project was sought prior to commencing data collection, and the 
study was assessed and approved by the University of Edinburgh Clinical Psychology 
Doctorate Research Ethics Group, a local NHS Research Ethics Committee (see Error! 
Reference source not found.) and local NHS Caldicott Guardian (see Error! 
Reference source not found.). Additionally, approval to conduct the research was 
granted by NHS Management/Governance (see Error! Reference source not found.). 
 
4.4 Method of analyses 
All data were analysed using the statistical package SPSS (version 13.0 for Windows). 
Exploratory data analysis methods were used to ascertain whether the data met the 
assumptions of parametric statistical methods. The assessment of the normality of 
distributions was particularly important because many inferential statistics are not 
robust to violations of this assumption (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Therefore box plots 
and histograms were examined, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to assess 
normality and (where appropriate) Levene‟s test was used to assess homogeneity of 
variance. Where necessary, transformations were attempted using square root, base 10 
logarithm or reciprocal functions and if these were unsuccessful equivalent non-
parametric tests were used. 
 
After careful consideration of the experimental design and hypotheses it was decided 
that the primary research questions would be most logically analysed separately via a 
series of repeated measures t-tests rather than ANOVAs. Therefore repeated measures t-
tests or (where appropriate) Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests were used to analyse the 
primary hypotheses. Pearson‟s and (where appropriate) Kendall‟s Tau correlations were 
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calculated to measure the associations between the variables identified in the secondary 
hypotheses. Scatterplots were first examined for outliers and to ensure relationships 
were linear. Because of the number of correlations calculated, a more stringent p value 
of p < .01 was adopted to protect against the possibility of Type I errors. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
All data presented and analysed here came from the 36 experimental interview 
participants. There were no missing data from the measures collected therefore (unless 
otherwise specified) N is always 36.  
 
5.1 Success of experimental manipulation 
To ascertain whether the verbal and imaginal conditions had successfully managed to 
manipulate the experimental interview participant‟s experience of pain imagery, the 
image vividness ratings were compared. Figure 3 displays the frequencies of the 
vividness ratings under the two experimental conditions. 
 
 




The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the vividness ratings in the verbal, D(36) = 
.31, p < .01, and imaginal condition, D(36) = .39, p < .01, were significantly non-
normal. None of the transformations attempted resulted in both groups displaying 
normal distributions, furthermore when a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was conducted 
this resulted in half of the ranks being tied, making the appropriateness of this test 
questionable. Following consideration of the distribution of the data, a decision was 
made to collapse the categories into dichotomous variables and compare the two 
conditions using a McNemar test. Ratings of 1 and 2 („perfectly clear and as vivid as 
normal vision‟ and „clear and reasonably vivid‟) were combined, as were ratings of 3, 4 
and 5 („moderately clear and vivid‟, „vague and dim‟ and „no image at all‟). McNemar‟s 
test (see Table 2) indicated that the verbal and imaginal condition vividness ratings were 
significantly different, indicating more vivid imagery in the imaginal condition, p = .01. 
Thus the experimental manipulation appeared to be successful. However, from 
examination of the raw data it is questionable whether this statistical difference is also a 
clinically meaningful one (discussed further in 6.4.1). 
 
Table 2: Dichotomised pain imagery vividness ratings cross-tabulation 
 Imaginal Condition 
More Vivid Less Vivid 
Verbal 
Condition 
More Vivid 13 1 
Less Vivid 10 12 
 
5.2 Primary hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a difference in the reported pain intensity (1a) and 
strength of emotions [fear (1b), sadness (1c), anger (1d), disgust (1e), and 
happiness (1f)] between the baseline and the experimental conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a difference in the reported pain intensity (2a) and 
strength of emotions [fear (2b), sadness (2c), anger (2d), disgust (2e), and 
happiness (2f)] between the imaginal and verbal conditions.  
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See Table 3 for the means and standard deviations or medians and interquartile ranges 
(where appropriate) for the pain intensity and emotion ratings at baseline and during the 
two experimental conditions. Pain intensity and each of the basic emotions ratings will 
be discussed in turn. 
 
Table 3: Measures of central tendency and dispersion for visual analogue 
scale ratings of pain and emotion intensity 




Pain Intensity Mean (SD) 38.5 (23.9) 39.9 (23.9) 46.5 (24.9) 
Fear Median (IQR) 4.5 (32.5) 10.0 (28.0) 9.0 (29.5) 
Sadness Median (IQR) 4.5 (19.0) 10.5 (28.0) 12.5 (22.0) 
Anger Mean (SD) 11.2 (20.0) 20.9 (27.7) 18.5 (25.6) 
Disgust Mean (SD) 6.9 (13.9) 18.1 (27.0) 16.2 (26.5) 
Happiness Mean (SD) 46.8 (28.3) 33.7 (26.5) 33.6 (28.0) 
 
5.2.1 Pain intensity 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the pain ratings displayed a normal 
distribution at baseline, D(36) = .12, p > .20, ns, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .11, p 
> .20, ns, and in the imaginal condition, D(36) = .10, p > .20, ns.  
 
To ascertain whether there were significant differences in the pain ratings at baseline 
and in the verbal and imaginal conditions, two repeated measures t-tests were 
conducted. This revealed that there was no significant difference between the baseline 
and verbal condition ratings t(35) = 0.54, p = .60, ns, however there was a difference 
between baseline and the imaginal condition, with imaginal pain ratings being 
significantly higher than baseline pain ratings t(35) = 2.56, p = .02. Thus support for 
hypothesis 1a was found for the imaginal condition but not the verbal one.  
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To evaluate the evidence for hypothesis 2a, a repeated measures t-test was conducted 
which revealed that the imaginal condition pain intensity ratings were significantly 




The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the fear ratings at baseline, D(36) = .30, p 
< .01, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .19, p < .01, and in the imaginal condition, D(36) 
= .23, p < .01 were all significantly non-normal, with histograms indicating severely 
positively skewed distributions. None of the transformations attempted resulted in all 
three groups displaying normal distributions and so two Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests 
were conducted. These indicated that there were no differences between the baseline 
and verbal condition, T = 222, p = .61, ns, or between the baseline and imaginal 
condition fear ratings, T = 145, p = .19, ns. Thus hypothesis 1b was not supported.  
 
Hypothesis 2b was also not supported, as a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicated that 
there were no differences between the verbal and imaginal condition fear ratings, T = 
153.5, p = .26, ns. 
 
5.2.3 Sadness 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the sadness ratings at baseline, D(36) = .22, 
p < .01, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .24, p < .01, and in the imaginal condition, 
D(36) = .23, p < .01 were all significantly non-normal, with histograms indicating 
severely positively skewed distributions. Transformations were again unsuccessful and 
so two Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests were conducted. These indicated that both the 
verbal condition ratings, T = 91, p = .02, and the imaginal condition ratings, T = 98, p = 




There was no evidence found to support Hypothesis 2c as a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test 
indicated that there were no differences between the verbal and imaginal condition 
sadness ratings, T = 235, p = .80, ns. 
 
5.2.4 Anger 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the anger ratings at baseline, D(36) = .29, p 
< .01, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .23, p < .01, and in the imaginal condition, D(36) 
= .27, p < .01 were all significantly non-normal, with histograms indicating positively 
skewed distributions. Consequently data were transformed using a base 10 logarithm, 
which corrected the skew and produced a normal distribution for the baseline, D(36) = 
.11, p > .20, ns, verbal condition, D(36) = .12, p = .18, ns, and imaginal condition D(36) 
= .13, p = .10, ns. 
 
To ascertain whether there were significant differences in the anger ratings at baseline 
and in the verbal and imaginal conditions, two repeated measures t-tests were conducted 
on the transformed data. This revealed that there were significant differences between 
both the baseline and verbal condition ratings t(35) = 2.65, p = .01, and the baseline and 
imaginal condition ratings t(35) = -2.09, p = .04. The anger ratings for the verbal and 
imaginal conditions were both significantly higher than baseline, thus hypothesis 1d 
was supported. 
 
No support was found for hypothesis 2d as a repeated measures t-test conducted on the 
log transformed data revealed that there were no significant differences between 




The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the disgust ratings at baseline, D(36) = .31, 
p < .01, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .28, p < .01, and in the imaginal condition, 
D(36) = .30, p < .01 were all significantly non-normal, with histograms indicating 
positively skewed distributions. Consequently data were transformed using a base 10 
logarithm, which corrected the skew and produced a normal distribution for the 
baseline, D(36) = .12, p = .18, ns, verbal condition, D(36) = .13, p = .14, ns, and 
imaginal condition D(36) = .14, p = .07, ns. 
 
To ascertain whether there were significant differences in the anger ratings at baseline 
and in the verbal and imaginal conditions, two repeated measures t-tests were conducted 
on the transformed data. This revealed that there were significant differences between 
both the baseline and verbal condition ratings t(35) = 3.37, p < .01, and the baseline and 
imaginal condition ratings t(35) = 2.63, p = .01. The disgust ratings for the verbal and 
imaginal conditions were both significantly higher than baseline, thus hypothesis 1e was 
supported. 
 
No support was found for hypothesis 2e as a repeated measures t-test conducted on the 
log transformed data revealed that there were no significant differences between 
imaginal and verbal condition disgust ratings, t(35) = 1.14, p = .26, ns. 
 
5.2.6 Happiness 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the happiness ratings displayed a normal 
distribution at baseline, D(36) = .10, p > .20, ns, in the verbal condition, D(36) = .12, p 
= .20, ns, and in the imaginal condition, D(36) = .10, p = .11, ns.  
 
To ascertain whether there were significant differences in the happiness ratings at 
baseline and in the verbal and imaginal conditions, two repeated measures t-tests were 
conducted. This revealed that there were significant differences between both the 
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baseline and verbal condition ratings t(35) = 2.53, p = .02, and the baseline and imaginal 
condition ratings t(35) = 2.57, p = .02. The happiness ratings for the verbal and imaginal 
conditions were both significantly lower than baseline, thus hypothesis 1f was 
supported. 
 
No support was found for hypothesis 2f as a repeated measures t-test revealed that there 
were no significant differences between imaginal and verbal condition happiness 
ratings, t(35) = 0.06, p = .95, ns. 
 
5.2.7 Hypothesis 1 Summary 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. The experiment found that pain intensity in the 
imaginal condition but not the verbal condition was higher than at baseline. Of the 
negative emotions, sadness, anger and disgust ratings were all higher in both 
experimental conditions than at baseline, however there were no significant differences 
found for fear intensity ratings. For the positive emotion happiness, ratings were found 
to be significantly lower during both experimental conditions compared to baseline.  
 
5.2.8 Hypothesis 2 Summary 
Only hypothesis 2a was supported as the experiment found that only pain intensity 
ratings were higher in the imaginal compared to verbal condition. There were no 




5.3 Secondary hypotheses 
5.3.1 Normality 
The variables involved in the secondary hypotheses were explored through examination 
of box plots and histograms and assessed for normality. See Table 4 for the outcomes of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the raw variables and any successful transformations 
utilised. As transformations were successful, Pearson‟s correlations were utilised for the 
majority of the relationships examined.  
 
Table 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality (d.f. = 36) 
Variable D p Distribution 
Pain imagery distress .14 .07 Normal 
Pain imagery interference .14 .09 Normal 
Pain imagery controllability .14 .08 Normal 
HADS anxiety score .10 > .20 Normal 
HADS depression score .15 .03 Significantly non-normal 
Transformed HADS depression score 
(square root) 
.14 .09 Normal 
VVIQ total score .17 .01 Significantly non-normal 
Transformed VVIQ total score  
(base 10 logarithm) 
.14 .08 Normal 
SUIS total score .19 < .01 Significantly non-normal 
Transformed SUIS total score  
(square root of reversed scores) 
.12 > .20 Normal 
 
Pain imagery frequency was not assessed for normality as it is an ordinal rather than 
interval measure, therefore the non-parametric Kendall‟s tau
1
 correlations were 
calculated for relationships with this variable.  
 
                                                 
1




5.3.2 Hypothesis 3  
Positive correlations will exist between imagery frequency, distress and 
interference. Negative correlations will exist between pain imagery 
controllability and imagery frequency, distress and interference.  
 
See Table 5 for the correlation matrix exploring the relationships between imagery 
frequency, distress
2
, interference and controllability.  
 
Table 5: Correlations between imagery characteristics 






Image Frequency  τ .09 .24 -.27 
Image Distress r - .41* -.15 
Image Interference r - - -.09 
*Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level or better (2-tailed). 
 
Thus minimal support was found for hypothesis 3, of all the imagery characteristics 
examined only distress and interference significantly correlated, with high imagery 
distress being associated with high imagery interference.  
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis 4  
Less controllable, more frequently occurring, more distressing and more 
interfering images will be associated with higher levels of self-reported anxiety 
and depression.  
 
See Table 6 for the correlation matrix exploring the relationship between imagery 
characteristics and HADS anxiety and (transformed) depression scores.  
 
                                                 
2
 For simplicity, raw data were re-coded from 0 to 100 with higher numbers indicating higher distress 
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Table 6: Correlations between imagery characteristics and HADS anxiety 
and depression scores 
 Anxiety Depression 
Image Frequency  τ .35* .11 
Image Distress r .24 .02 
Image Interference r .51* .25 
Image Controllability r -.03 -.05 
*Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level or better (2-tailed). 
 
Thus partial support was found for hypotheses 4 as more frequently occurring and 
interfering pain images were found to be associated with higher self-reported anxiety. 
No significant associations were found for image distress or controllability or between 
any imagery characteristic and self-reported depression.  
 
5.3.4 Hypothesis 5 
People who have more spontaneous and more vivid general everyday images 
will also experience pain images which are less controllable, occur more 
frequently, are more distressing and more interfering. 
 
See Table 7 for the correlation matrix exploring the relationship between imagery 
characteristics and VVIQ and SUIS total scores (both transformed).  
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Table 7: Correlations between imagery characteristics and VVIQ and SUIS 
total scores 
 VVIQ SUIS 
Image Frequency  τ -.02 .49*
3
 
Image Distress r -.36 .01 
Image Interference r -.18 .05 
Image Controllability r .10 -.24 
*Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level or better (2-tailed). 
 
Thus minimal support was found for hypothesis 5, of all the imagery characteristics 
examined only image frequency was associated with SUIS scores, with people who 
experience more spontaneously occurring general imagery also experiencing more 
frequent pain imagery.  
 
                                                 
3
 One outlier was removed from this analysis, therefore N = 35 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
This chapter first discusses the representativeness of the study recruitment and 
experimental populations and considers the differences found between the imagers and 
non-imagers in the recruitment sample. Following this, the outcomes of the analysis of 
the evidence for the primary and secondary hypotheses are reviewed within the context 
of the research and models presented in the first three chapters. Next the limitations and 
strengths of the study are examined and the theoretical and clinical implications of the 
results considered. Finally, potential ideas for areas of future research are explored. 
   
6.1 Study population 
6.1.1 Comparison to other chronic pain populations 
Both the recruitment and experimental sample were heterogeneous groups, reflecting 
the nature of the chronic pain population seen in the specialist clinic. As previously 
mentioned, Fricker (2003) conducted a Europe-wide study of chronic, non-malignant 
pain. In comparison, the recruitment sample in this study had a slightly older average 
age (53 cf. 50) and higher proportion of females (69 per cent cf. 56 per cent).  
The duration of chronic pain reported was slightly different to Fricker (2003), as the 
median duration was 6 years rather than 7, however similarly around one fifth of the 
sample said that they had been in pain for 20 years or more.  
 
Overall it seems reasonable to assume that the sample recruited to the study were 
representative of the heterogeneous chronic pain population as a whole in terms of their 
age and pain duration. However, the fact that there is a higher proportion of females in 
this study‟s sample should be borne in mind when interpreting the presented results.   
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6.1.2 Representativeness of experimental sample 
The experimental sample appeared to be fairly representative of the recruitment as well 
as the imagers sample, as no significant differences were found in the history of mental 
health problems, duration of pain, number of pain locations or knowledge of the cause 
of their chronic pain. However, the experimental sample contained a significantly 
higher proportion of females than the recruitment sample and were significantly older 
than the other imagers. The experimental sample being older than the other imagers is a 
concern as it suggests that results may not be generalisable to the whole age range of 
imagers. On the other hand, the age of the experimental sample did not significantly 
differ from the recruitment sample, therefore the experimental sample can be assumed 
to be representative in terms of age of the general population of people with chronic 
pain, which is perhaps more important. The overrepresentation of females in the 
experimental sample is a concern which should again be borne in mind when 
interpreting the presented results.   
 
6.1.3 Differences between imagers and non-imagers 
42 per cent of the recruitment sample reported experiencing imagery associated with 
their chronic pain. This is a slightly higher proportion than the 39 per cent reported by 
Gosden (2008), which used a very similar methodology with a comparable 
heterogeneous population. However, the difference is very small and a degree of chance 
variability is likely between studies, so it is probable that it does not reflect an important 
discrepancy. The fact that similar significant proportions of people reported imagery 
following the single question used by this study and Gosden (2008) (in two different 
locations) validates the phenomena of specific mental pain imagery as something that 
people can reliably report on with minimal prompting.  
 
Comparisons between people who reported experiencing chronic pain images and those 
who did not revealed no differences in sex, duration of chronic pain, number of pain 
locations or whether they knew the cause of the chronic pain. However, imagers were 
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younger and had experienced significantly more mental health problems than non-
imagers. The difference between imagers and non-imagers in terms of the number of 
mental health problems experienced warrants further discussion. Assuming that the 
presence of pain imagery indicates higher imagery ability in general, the higher 
prevalence of mental health problems in the imagers coincides with previous research 
which has found a close link between imagery and emotion (as discussed in 2.4). 
Furthermore, it also ties into the chronic pain specific studies which found that chronic 
pain imagery is associated with higher levels of depression (Gosden, 2008; Potter, 
2007), anxiety and catastrophising (Potter, 2007).  
 
None of the research into chronic pain imagery has thus far has specifically examined 
causality, and so the reason behind this association is currently unclear. It could be that 
pain specific or general imagery processes lead to diagnosable psychological disorder, 
or perhaps mental health problems can themselves lead to imagery. The relationship 
may work in both directions or alternatively imagery and mental health problems could 
be linked by a third associated variable, for example the personality trait neuroticism. 
This trait is well known as a risk factor for the development of both depression and 
anxiety disorders (Matthews & Deary, 1998), and as a general tendency towards greater 
awareness of aversive internal states it could conceivably also make people more aware 
of distressing mental imagery.  
 
Another potentially important variable that may link pain imagery and mental health 
problems is arousal level. Bywaters et al. (2004a) suggest that arousal may have a key 
role to play in the link between anxiety and imagery vividness. They argue that people 
who have high levels of state or trait anxiety will consequently have a high level of 
physiological arousal and this may make their imagery more vivid. Indeed their research 
did find that higher state anxiety (STAI) was associated with higher imagery vividness 
for a set of pictures recalled after a 15 minute delay (Bywaters et al., 2004a, also 
discussed in 2.4.1). However, as they did not specifically measure arousal they cannot 
conclusively provide evidence for their hypothesis. Additionally, the causality could 
work in the opposite direction to their proposal and so longitudinal research would be 
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necessary to tease out how imagery vividness, psychological disorder and arousal may 
interact over time.  
 
Regardless of which comes first however, if imagery is found to be involved in the 
maintenance of a psychological disorder then it becomes a legitimate target for 
intervention. According to the evidence reviewed in 2.4.2, the way in which imagery 
becomes a problem depends on the specific psychological disorder. For example in 
social phobia distorted imagery of the self increases anxiety and distracts the person‟s 
attention away from relevant social information. Contrarily, in GAD it is the avoidance 
and suppression of imagery through verbal rumination which is thought to be key. 
Although there is not yet sufficient research to conclude exactly how specific chronic 
pain imagery may interact with emotion or psychological difficulties, the present study 
at least provides some much needed initial exploration of these relationships.   
 
6.2 Primary hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. The experiment found that pain intensity in the 
imaginal condition but not the verbal condition was higher than at baseline. Of the 
negative emotions, sadness, anger and disgust ratings were all higher in both 
experimental conditions than at baseline, however there were no significant differences 
found for fear intensity ratings. For the positive emotion happiness, ratings were found 
to be significantly lower during both experimental conditions compared to baseline.  
 
Only hypothesis 2a was supported as the experiment found that only pain intensity 
ratings were higher in the imaginal compared to verbal condition. There were no 




6.2.1 Pain intensity 
Perceived pain intensity was expected to increase in both experimental conditions 
because the participant‟s attention was being specifically drawn to their pain as they 
were required to evoke their pain imagery or describe the pain itself. However, the 
majority of research discussed in 1.4.3.1 on which this hypothesis was based examined 
the intensity of experimentally induced acute pain, and so this study provides some 
indication of the effects of attention on chronic pain. The lack of change between the 
baseline and verbal condition could potentially be explained by the location of the 
experiment interviews, which took place in one of the clinical rooms used for the 
hospital pain clinic. Before the interview, the participants would have attended at least 
one appointment in the pain clinic, at which they would have described their pain 
verbally as well as possibly experienced a painful physical examination. Consequently 
the environment they were in may have already become a conditioned stimulus for 
increased pain intensity. Furthermore, given that the participants knew they would be 
asked to talk about their pain; this may have already naturally drawn their attention to it. 
It is possible that this priming effect was most powerful for the verbal condition because 
the instruction to describe their pain would have been a familiar task they were 
expecting and had done before. Although (because of the nature of the recruitment 
process) they would have also known they would be asked about their pain imagery, 
this would still have been a more novel request.  
 
The difference between the verbal and imaginal conditions cannot be accounted for by a 
greater increase in emotion in the imaginal condition, as the results indicate that there 
was no difference between the experimental conditions in any of the five basic 
emotions. The increase seen in pain intensity in the imaginal condition instead suggests 
that being asked to evoke pain imagery is perhaps a qualitatively different type of 
paying attention to pain. Borkovec et al. (1998) propose that thinking about an 
emotional topic in verbal thoughts results in a drop in physiological response. A 
reduction in physiological arousal would be expected to reduce perceived pain intensity 
(as in relaxation interventions) and therefore this suggests a potential explanation of 
these results. It is perhaps also the case that providing a verbal description but not 
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evoking a pain image enables participants to detach from the pain itself and avoid 
engaging with it, in a similar way to how verbal worry in GAD is proposed to provide a 
method of avoiding distressing mental images which would otherwise intrude.  
 
6.2.2 Fear 
Given the extensive research on the role of fear in chronic pain (see 1.4.2.1) it is 
somewhat surprising that no differences were found in fear ratings between baseline and 
the two experimental conditions. There appears to be a trend towards fear being slightly 
elevated in the experimental conditions, however this difference did not reach statistical 
significance. Furthermore, the visual condition was expected to be more fear inducing 
than the verbal one because of the link between pain imagery and catastrophising found 
by Potter (2007). Examination of descriptive data indicates that the median fear ratings 
were very low, which suggests that the VAS measure used could have been confounded 
by a floor effect. However, the median sadness ratings were equally low, and this 
emotion did reveal a statistically significant difference between baseline and the 
experimental conditions, therefore floor effects cannot provide a full explanation. The 
descriptive data also indicates that the variance in fear ratings was very large 
(particularly at baseline), which is perhaps why no statistically significant differences 
were found. In comparison to the spread of the data in the sadness ratings, the fear 
ratings were much more widely distributed, and it is possible that the lack of statistically 
significant difference was due to confounding variability („noise‟) in the data.  
 
Initial anxiety and then subsequent habituation to the experiment interview environment 
could have potentially been a key source of this confounding variability. Anecdotally, 
the experimenter noticed that many of the participants appeared to be nervous when 
they first entered the clinic room and filled in the baseline questionnaire, however this 
anxiety decreased as the participant became more comfortable with both the 
experimenter and the experiment tasks. The elevated fear they felt at baseline may have 
been due to the associations of the clinic environment (as discussed above), not 
knowing what they would be asked to do or social anxiety about meeting someone new. 
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Meeting a psychologist for the first time in particular is thought to be anxiety provoking 
because many people assume they will „read their minds and analyze their behaviour for 
deviancies‟ (Dovidio & Esses, 2007, p.5). This potentially confounding factor could 
perhaps have been addressed by a longer initial acclimatisation period which may have 
allowed habituation to occur, consequently reducing the variability in the baseline 
scores, allowing clearer effects of the intervention manipulation to be seen.  
 
6.2.3 Sadness, anger, disgust and happiness 
Sadness, anger and disgust ratings were found to increase from baseline to both 
experimental conditions and happiness was found to decrease. However, there were no 
significant differences between the verbal and imaginal conditions. Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (1987) propose that emotions are elicited by significant junctures of plans or 
goals. Therefore it could be speculated that sadness increased when participants‟ 
attention was drawn to their pain because it may have reminded them of the impact of 
chronic pain on their life in terms of the loss of active goals. Similarly, anger may have 
increased because of the reminder of current goals being blocked by having to manage 
the pain. The increase in anger ratings from baseline to experimental conditions is also 
important to note because it does not fit with suggestions made by, for example, Braha 
and Catchlove (1986) and Kerns et al. (1994) that patients with chronic pain have 
difficulty recognising and reporting this negative affect.  
 
Although the reason for the link with disgust is not as clear from Oatley and Johnson-
Laird‟s (1987) framework, other research (see 1.4.2.4) indicates that talking about pain 
may have evoked disgust because of the associated negative societal stereotypes 
(Werner et al., 2004). Happiness perhaps decreased between baseline and the 
experimental conditions because being reminded of the pain and therefore of its 




There are a number of potential explanations as to why there were no differences 
between the verbal and imaginal condition emotion ratings. Specifically, the lack of 
differences can be understood through a SPAARS (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008) 
perspective, in terms of links with autobiographical memory or are potentially the result 
of sampling bias or subtle demand characteristics. Each of these explanations is 
considered in turn below.  
 
6.2.3.1 SPAARS  
The SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008) discussed in 2.2.2 and 2.4.3.2 
suggests that imagery may have a direct link to emotion through the schematic level 
(route one) and associative level (route two), the latter because imagery commonly 
functions as an unconditioned or conditioned stimulus (Dadds et al., 1997; 2004). In 
contrast, verbal representations are thought to be more like cognitions at the 
propositional level of meaning, which does not have a direct route to emotion. 
However, while this model provides a good account of the effects seen in experimental 
research which has used experimenter-generated scenarios to compare imaginal and 
verbal representations (such as the work of Holmes and colleagues), this study sought to 
explore the naturally occurring entirely participant-generated descriptive words and 
imagery in chronic pain. Thus the topics of the experiment interview were more 
personally relevant to the participants, and so consequently it may be that the verbal 
condition still activated a schematic level model of the self in pain which led to the 
generation of emotion via route one. It is also possible that the lack of difference 
between the experimental conditions is because both pain words and pain images would 
have already become associated with an emotional response via route two. 
 
The association between pain words and emotion may have arisen from numerous 
experiences of undergoing pain inducing physical examinations while having to 
simultaneously describe the pain to a medical professional. Additionally, in an everyday 
scenario an increase in pain could cause a change of facial expression, which may 
produce an enquiry of concern from a nearby friend or relative. This enquiry may 
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naturally lead the person to use pain descriptive words to tell the enquirer about their 
experience. In terms of the association between pain images and emotion, Gosden‟s 
(2008) research indicated that mental imagery of pain is most often triggered by an 
increase in perceived pain. Thus with repeat pairings, both descriptive pain words and 
mental imagery may have become associated with an emotional response to the pain 
itself. Considering this possibility, the SPAARS model does not have any difficulty in 
accounting for these results as the verbal descriptive words can activate emotion 
through route two just as well as the pain imagery can.  
 
The potential associative power of pain descriptive words was therefore perhaps 
underestimated when the hypotheses were composed. In support of this idea, some 
research in people who experience migraine has found that presenting pain descriptive 
words leads to an increase in physiological activity as measured through skin 
conductance (Jamner & Tursky, 1987). The magnitude of this increase was found to be 
significantly greater than it was with a control group, and was also accompanied by an 
increase in pain perception and anxiety. 
 
6.2.3.2 Autobiographical memory 
Holmes and Mathews (2010) propose that imagery causes a stronger emotional response 
than the equivalent verbal representation because mental images provide a direct link to 
autobiographical memory (see 2.4.3.3). It was hypothesised that evoking chronic pain 
mental imagery may also link to emotional autobiographical memories and therefore 
cause a stronger affective response than verbal descriptions of pain. In support of this 
idea some qualitative research into women‟s mental images of their breast cancer 
conducted by Harrow et al. (2008) indicated that mental images were influenced by 
scan images and verbal metaphors presented by health professionals, both of which may 
be linked to emotional autobiographical memories. However, perhaps the lack of 
difference between verbal and imaginal conditions in this research is because chronic 
pain imagery is not always connected to emotionally salient autobiographical events. 
Indeed, on reading Gosden‟s (2008) thematic analysis of the descriptions of pain 
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imagery it is not immediately obvious that these pain images should be linked to 
autobiographical memory, unlike the mental images in the recent study by Harrow et al. 
(2008). However, one theme (anatomical representation of damage) could be 
hypothesised to be linked to a memory of seeing a scan image or hearing an anatomical 
description from a health professional. Nevertheless, it is clear that this kind of link 
cannot be made with all of the themes identified and so this lack of autobiographical 
memory link may be another potential explanation of why no verbal-imaginal 
differences were found with emotional ratings.   
 
6.2.3.3 Sampling bias 
This study selected the experimental sample only from the 42 per cent of the 
recruitment sample who spontaneously reported experiencing imagery associated with 
their chronic pain on the recruitment brief questionnaire. It is possible that this element 
of the design contributed to the lack of verbal-imaginal differences, as it is potentially 
only for these individuals that both imagery and verbal processing of pain 
representations have similar emotional effects. Other research into verbal-imaginal 
differences has not selected people according to whether they are able to report imagery 
following only one enquiry on a questionnaire. It was thought important to use this 
method and select the experimental sample from only the imagers in this study to ensure 
that the pain images themselves were genuine and not the result of the greater demand 
characteristics present in a face-to-face interaction (a common criticism levelled at 
imagery research in general). It is potentially possible, however, that individuals who 
did not spontaneously report imagery could have been helped to evoke images through 
an interview and further description of the nature of the phenomena. Perhaps a 
proportion of the non-imagers may be (consciously or unconsciously) avoiding being 
aware of their pain imagery, like avoidance of imagery in PTSD and GAD. Although 
these ideas are all currently speculative, if it were possible to elicit images from the non-
imagers through an interview it would be interesting to explore whether this non-
spontaneous imagery group showed a similar pattern of results to the participants in this 
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study. Possibly it is only for this group (and not the spontaneous imagers) that a verbal-
imaginal emotional difference exists.  
 
6.2.3.4 Demand characteristics 
A final potential explanation for the lack of verbal-imaginal differences found in the 
emotion ratings is demand characteristics. Experimenter expectancy can have exert a 
significant influence over people‟s performance and responses (Rosenthal, 1976; 2003), 
which is why double blind studies (where both the participant and experimenter are 
unaware which condition someone is in) are seen as the most methodologically rigorous 
(Sheldrake, 1998). Although the hypotheses state that a difference would be found, 
personally I have had some difficulty in understanding the research into imagery, as it is 
not something I experience myself. One study suggests that practitioners‟ personal 
internal experiences and imagery vividness are a key determinant of whether or not they 
are sympathetic to the imagery side of the analogical-propositional debate (Reisberg et 
al., 2003). Taking this into account then, it is possible that because I do not experience 
imagery I did not truly expect to find any differences, which could have subtly 
influenced participants‟ ratings to confirm this expectation.  
 
One possible way to address this concern could have been to conduct post-experimental 
interviews asking each participant what they though the experimental hypothesis might 
have been, a method often employed by Kosslyn (e.g. 2006). However, even if 
participants who guess correctly are excluded, many may intuitively understand the 
purpose of an experiment in a vague inarticulate way that they are not able to (or 
confident enough to) explain to an experimenter (Orne, 1962). However, on further 
consideration it seems unlikely that the lack of verbal-imaginal difference was entirely 
due to demand characteristics, as imagery vividness ratings indicated that the 
experimental manipulation was successful, additionally there was a difference found 
between the imaginal and verbal condition pain intensity ratings. There is no reason to 
suppose that experimenter expectancy would have operated differently for the pain 
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In summary, it appears that drawing a person‟s attention to their chronic pain and 
eliciting either verbal or imaginal descriptions results in an increase in sadness, anger 
and disgust and a decrease in happiness. This could be because describing the pain 
reminds participants of the effects of their chronic pain in terms of the implications for 
important personal goals. Providing a verbal description of pain does not cause an 
increase in perceived pain intensity, although evoking pain imagery does. This is 
potentially because being asked about pain imagery results in paying attention to the 
pain in a qualitatively different way, which does not allow detachment from the pain 
itself which may happen with verbal descriptions. There were no differences found in 
fear ratings across the baseline or two experimental conditions, possibly because of the 
high variability in the ratings, particularly at baseline. This variability may perhaps have 
been caused by fear associations with the environment and the anxiety provoking effect 
of attending an unknown psychological experiment. There were no differences found in 
any of the emotional responses between the imaginal and verbal conditions. It seems 
likely that this is because, unlike other highly emotive imagery, naturally occurring 
idiosyncratic chronic pain images do not necessarily access emotionally salient 
autobiographical memories. Furthermore it is likely that over time, pain descriptive 
words will have become associated with an emotional response and so (as outlined in 
the SPAARS model) act through the associative or schema route and provide a direct 
route to emotion just as powerfully as pain imagery does.  
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6.3 Secondary hypotheses 
6.3.1 Hypothesis 3 
Only minimal support was found for hypothesis 3, of all the imagery characteristics 
examined only distress and interference significantly correlated, with high imagery 
distress being associated with high imagery interference. This was also found by 
Gosden (2008), and it is logical that someone who finds their mental image more 
distressing would also find that it interferes to a greater extent in their day to day life. 
However, the lack of significant correlations found between the other variables is 
surprising. It may be that the small sample size resulted in insufficient power to detect 
significant correlations, particularly given the more stringent p value adopted. Again, 
the process of developing and validating a pain imagery measure would clarify the 
nature of the potential relationships between these variables. 
 
6.3.2 Hypothesis 4 
Partial support was found for hypotheses 4 as more frequently occurring and interfering 
pain images were found to be associated with higher self-reported anxiety. No 
significant associations were found for image distress or controllability or between any 
imagery characteristic and self-reported depression. It therefore appears that anxiety is 
more closely tied to imagery variables than depression in this population. Given this, it 
is particularly surprising that the experiment did not reveal any differences in fear 
ratings, although as discussed these were possibly lost in the „noise‟ of the data at 
baseline.  
 
Unfortunately however, it is not clear exactly why higher image frequency and 
interference should be associated with higher anxiety. As discussed in 6.1.3, the 
directionality of any causal relationships can only be hypothesised. Does a frequent 
chronic pain image result from having a high level of arousal as a consequence of 
anxiety psychopathology? Or does the image cause anxiety? Likewise, is the imagery 
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interference a function of overall anxiety level or does a more interfering image cause 
anxiety symptoms? It does not seem unreasonable to suggest the relationship probably 
works in both directions, as in a number of psychological disorders where mental 
imagery can become part of a positive feedback maintenance cycle, as discussed in 
2.4.2.  
 
6.3.3 Hypothesis 5 
Minimal support was found for hypothesis 5, of all the imagery characteristics 
examined only image frequency was associated with SUIS scores. Thus, as might be 
logically expected, people who experience more spontaneously occurring general 
imagery also experience more frequent pain imagery. Again, the lack of statistically 
significant correlation between the pain imagery characteristics and the vividness and 
degree of spontaneous general imagery could perhaps be attributed to the small sample 
size. Alternatively, it could be that as the sample in this study were selected on the basis 
of experiencing mental pain imagery, this could have resulted in an artificial attenuation 
of the variance of the vividness and degree of spontaneous general imagery. With most 
individuals being at the upper end of the scales, there would be less variance in the 
scores available to correlate. It is also possible that the questions used to measure the 
pain imagery characteristics do not individually capture the important aspects of pain 
imagery in a robust way, again highlighting the need for the development of a pain 
imagery measure. 
  
6.4 Reflection on study methodology 
6.4.1 Limitations  
One potential limitation which should be discussed is the fact that some researchers and 
clinicians have commented that people with chronic pain may be unable to reflect and 
accurately report on emotional experiences as they „fail to recognise affective distress 
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and, instead, somatise their complaints using both pain and non-pain somatic 
complaints‟ (Craig, 2005, p.267). Consequently it may have been advantageous to take 
more objective measurements of physiological arousal or, for example, have 
independent blind raters classify the degree of distress exhibited in facial expressions 
viewed via silent video recordings. However, these measures often introduce their own 
sources of unreliability, and in the end the suggestion that people with chronic pain are 
unable to accurately report on their emotional state is not supported by the significant 
changes seen in four of the five emotions ratings. 
 
Another potential limitation of this research is the method used to identify those people 
who experienced a mental image. Although the study aimed to enquire about images in 
any sensory modality, the wording of the identification question (see section 4.1.3) and 
in particular the phrase „a picture in your head‟ may have resulted in a bias towards 
visual imagery. It is therefore possible that if interviews had been used (as discussed in 
6.2.3.3) or if the identification question had been worded differently this may have 
captured a slightly different population which included more people with, for example, 
primarily auditory or tactile mental images. Unfortunately there is insufficient research 
in this area which could indicate the potential impact of a visual image bias, although 
any future studies should be mindful of this reflection and compose identification 
questions carefully.  
 
The choice of visual analogue scales to measure the dependent variables could be 
questioned. In particular, the unidimensional nature of VASs has been criticised as 
unrepresentative way to measure pain (Skevington, 1995) as it is a complex, 
multidimensional experience as indicated, for example, by the variety of items on the 
McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975). Furthermore, a literature search revealed 
few studies which used repeated VAS measurements so close together in time, perhaps 
reflecting the concern regarding the genuine sensitivity of this kind of measure. 
However, despite their limitations VASs were chosen because they are still much more 
sensitive than other more established Likert scales commonly used to measure emotion. 
Furthermore, there is substantial literature on the reliability and clinical validity of 
VASs for pain sensation intensity as well as the affective dimensions in both 
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experimentally induced and clinical pain (Wade et al., 1990; Williamson & Hoggart, 
2005).  
 
Another factor for consideration is the magnitude of the changes in pain and emotion 
ratings. The VASs provide a sensitive 100 point scale and the differences in average 
pain and emotion ratings represented only around 1cm change on the 10cm scale. It 
could be argued that these are statistically but not clinically significant differences. 
However, they still represent an approximately 10 per cent change and furthermore, 
given the time scales employed in the experiment interview it may be unreasonable to 
expect larger changes. Perhaps the magnitude of the differences could have been 
increased if the participants had been asked to rate the strongest the pain and emotions 
had been in the previous four minutes, rather than the average intensity rating implied 
by the wording used in this study.  
 
The design of the experiment and method of the experimental manipulation is another 
potential limitation in this study. A repeated measures design was chosen as individual 
differences in both imagery and pain perception would make between group 
comparisons between verbal and imaginal conditions difficult. However, it could be 
argued that trying to elicit solely verbal representation and description in people who 
spontaneously experience pain imagery is ecologically false. Although the vividness 
ratings revealed a statistical difference between the verbal and imaginal conditions, it is 
clear that the verbal condition still evoked at least some mental imagery in most (86 per 
cent) of the participants. Therefore, is this statistical difference between the conditions a 
clinically meaningful one? Along a similar line of argument much of the research which 
makes imaginal vs. verbal comparisons is confounded by the fact that verbal 
descriptions of imagery are required to check for instruction adherence (as in this 
study). Additionally in this research, the words used to describe pain in the verbal 
condition were often evocative of mental images, for example „stabbing‟, „burning‟ and 
„twisting‟. However, other research which has required verbal descriptions of internally 
generated imagery has still found differences between imaginal and verbal conditions 
(Holmes et al., 2008) and so it would be reasonable to assert that the methodology 
employed by this study is still valid. Had the results revealed no differences between 
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verbal and imaginal conditions on any of the dependent variables these criticisms may 
have been particularly powerful. However, as the pain intensity ratings did exhibit 
differences, this implies that the experimental manipulation was successful in producing 
clinically meaningfully different conditions. Nevertheless, this discussion does highlight 
that creating reliable manipulations of independent variables in this kind of study that 
are not confounded by these issues will continue to be a major challenge for this field as 
it develops.  
 
6.4.2 Strengths 
Despite the limitations discussed above however, this study still represents a substantial 
piece of work which has shed some light on the immediate emotional and pain 
perception effects of asking people to describe their pain and evoke pain imagery. The 
main strength of this study is that it is an exploration of a previously little investigated 
phenomenon, and so represents an important contribution to a small but growing field.  
 
Uniquely, this thesis brought together two areas of research: emotional factors in the 
chronic pain population and the clinical and academic study of the special relationship 
between imagery and emotion. Furthermore, this was an experimental study which 
could ask and answer different kinds of questions to the previous research into chronic 
pain imagery, which was primarily cross-sectional. It sampled a wide age range and 
heterogeneous clinical population drawn from a large geographical district covering 
both urban and rural areas and so is likely to be representative of the general UK 
population. It used a repeated measures design (with counterbalancing) to control for 
participant variability. Conditions were timed and distracting creative thinking tasks 
were employed to minimise carryover effects. Furthermore, vividness ratings were used 
to examine whether or not the experimental manipulation of the independent variable 
was successful. Two of the three pre-existing measures used were standardised, reliable 
and clinically valid. Multiple dependent variables were measured, with emotions 
presented in a number of randomly generated orders and selected on the basis of a 
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thorough understanding of the evidence-based categorical approach to the structure of 
emotion.  
 
Imagery is a particularly difficult area to study because of its analogical nature (Gordon, 
1972) which is perhaps why previous research into cognition in chronic pain has 
focussed almost exclusively on verbal representations and expressions. However, as this 
study proves, with a thoughtful design is possible to meaningfully investigate the effects 
of imagery and the fact that this is a little explored field provides a wealth of 
opportunity for further novel and stimulating research.  
 
6.5 Theoretical implications of results 
This study sought to identify verbal-imaginal differences in emotional response in a 
chronic pain population who spontaneously experience specific pain imagery. The fact 
that no differences were found could be used to argue that it should not be assumed that 
experimental results with normal populations (on which hypothesis 2 was primarily 
based) can be extrapolated to clinical populations, perhaps particularly in the 
idiosyncratic area of imagery research. When a topic is personally relevant to an 
individual, differences between verbal and imaginal representations may not be so clear-
cut, which should be an important consideration for future theories and research.  
 
The difference found in pain intensity ratings between the verbal and imaginal 
conditions was interpreted as indicating that evoking pain imagery represents a 
qualitatively different form of paying attention to pain than when providing a verbal 
description. Currently this is only a tentative suggestion, and it is unclear how this may 
be understood in relation to the existing research on attention in chronic pain, which has 
thus far not made any verbal-imaginal distinctions. Were this result to be replicated 
however, it is clear that this would provide a new perspective which should be 
integrated into attentional models and research. 
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Although the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 2008) can be used to provide 
an explanation of the present results, it could also have provided an account of the 
opposite results, had hypothesis 2 been fully supported. Although multi-level theories 
are commendable in their flexibility, this ability to account for apparently opposing data 
also makes the model somewhat non-falsifiable. The SPAARS account cannot 
specifically indicate which of the two routes to emotion are active with verbal 
descriptions and imaginal evocation, although the present results imply that they lead to 
the same degree of emotional change. While this model provides a useful heuristic for 
understanding and explaining observed effects, specific testable predictions are not 
easily generated, as highlighted by the present study.  
 
6.6 Clinical implications of results 
This study has replicated previous findings (Gosden, 2008) that a significant proportion 
of people with chronic pain (42 per cent) experience spontaneous mental images of their 
pain. Furthermore, for these people images are linked with both the level of perceived 
pain intensity and emotional responses. This is an important fact to publicise to 
professionals who work with this population, so that they are prompted to routinely 
enquire about chronic pain imagery during assessment. This is particularly important 
given that chronic pain imagery has not received much research attention and so may be 
neglected. It is possible that medical practitioners‟ choice of metaphor, use of scan 
images or explanation of anatomical features in consultations may have important 
implications for people‟s mental imagery of their pain. Although this was not 
specifically investigated by this study, potentially individuals may infer a variety of 
inaccuracies regarding pain nature, course and prognosis from their images.  
 
This research also highlights to psychologists who work with people with chronic pain 
that pain imagery should be routinely enquired about and explored during assessment. 
Pain images and their meaning may potentially be a useful way to access 
representations at the schematic model level which may be inaccessible via purely 
verbal exploration. However, psychologists and other professionals should also be made 
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aware that if they do ask patients about pain imagery this may cause a temporary 
increase in the perceived pain intensity as well as temporarily increase sadness, anger 
and disgust and decrease happiness. Consequently, the assessment of imagery should be 
conducted with sensitivity and with the consent of the person involved. 
 
The findings of this research also suggest that in people who spontaneously report pain 
images, the verbal and imaginal routes to emotion may be relatively overlapping, 
indicating that even talking about images may evoke them. Were these results reliably 
replicated, psychologists who work with people with chronic pain could use this in their 
practice to know that even without a procedure to directly evoke or express pain images 
(for example through artistic methods), asking people to describe their images would be 
sufficient to trigger an emotional response which could be enquired about.  
 
The fact that evoking pain-related mental images increases pain intensity and also 
results in a negative emotional response provides a clear rationale for the exploration of 
imagery-based interventions which target these images. Simple prolonged exposure to 
the images, direct manipulation and modification, changes in the way in which images 
are viewed or how their meaning is interpreted (including verbal reattribution methods) 
could potentially provide pain relief for significant numbers of people with chronic 
pain. Aside from direct pain control effects, these kinds of intervention could also 
potentially help to moderate peoples‟ emotional, cognitive and behavioural responses to 
the pain images. As previously suggested, imagery work may directly access 
representations at the schematic model level and so could provide a powerful medium to 
help change distorted or unhelpful pain-related schemas.  
 
Although there is not yet sufficient clinical research which indicates that imagery-based 
interventions are effective, imagery manipulation for therapeutic purposes could be a 
productive avenue to explore, and would not be contraindicated by this study‟s lack of 
verbal-imaginal emotional differences. This thesis is part of a small but growing body 
of literature (summarised below in 6.7) that suggests that these images are not trivial 
and so a logical next step for the further development of this field would be a controlled 
study of the clinical effects of manipulating mental images (further discussed in 6.8). 
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6.7 Summary of chronic pain imagery research 
Thus far, three studies (Potter, 2007; Gosden, 2008 and this research) have provided a 
tantalising glimpse into this familiar yet under-researched phenomenon. We know that a 
significant proportion of people spontaneously report experiencing imagery associated 
with their chronic pain and those that do so also report higher levels of anxiety, 
depression and catastrophising and rate their pain as more unpleasant (despite having 
the same level of pain intensity). The mental images are primarily visual and tactile and 
can be evoked during clinical interview. For the majority of those who spontaneously 
report imagery, the images occur at least everyday and are distressing. However, a small 
proportion of people report that their pain images are pleasant. People report that they 
have varying degrees of control over the imagery, although most find it interfering. The 
images themselves are highly idiosyncratic, although on an initial analysis of their 
content, three dominant themes appear. These relate to the sensory qualities of the pain; 
the individuals‟ beliefs about the physical cause of the pain and personal meanings 
about the presence of pain. Within personal meanings, themes of victimisation or 
punishment are the most common. In day to day life, the images often co-occur with an 
increase in pain levels, and people commonly respond by attempting to reduce, avoid or 
suppress the image (Gosden, 2008). When these images are deliberately evoked this 
results in a temporary increase in pain intensity, sadness, anger and disgust and a 
decrease in happiness. Among people who spontaneously report images, in terms of 
emotional response there are no differences between evoking pain images and in 
describing pain in single words. However, describing pain in single words does not 
result in the increase in pain intensity experienced when images are evoked.  
 
6.8 Areas of further study 
As mental imagery in chronic pain is a largely unexplored area, there are numerous 
unanswered research questions and opportunities for progressing the emerging literature 
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base. This field would benefit from a full qualitative analysis of people‟s image contents 
and themes, and potentially this could contribute to the construction of a pain imagery 
measure. The function of these images is not yet fully understood, furthermore future 
research may benefit from focussing on the cognitive or behavioural consequences of 
the imagery, for example are they always suppressed and avoided? Does this coping 
technique have negative longer-term consequences? Do the images serve to prompt 
particular maladaptive behaviours? Does a lot depend on, as might be suggested by 
CBT theory, the meaning of the image for the person? 
 
Further research could also be directed towards understanding the variables which are 
associated with chronic pain imagery. In particular, the directionality of the relationship 
between mental imagery and distress warrants further investigation. Longitudinal or 
prospective research may be key in understanding the temporal interaction between 
these variables. Alternatively, for example, an experimental study could examine 
changes in mental imagery prevalence or vividness before and after effective pain-
relieving interventions. The potential involvement of arousal and trait neuroticism (as 
discussed in 6.1.3) could be further explored. For example, the effect of arousal on 
imagery vividness could be directly manipulated through exercise prior to imagery, 
although this may be complicated in this population by the potential temporary 
exacerbation of pain through activity. Determining whether the level of physiological 
reactivity to pain is influenced by imagery would be important, because higher levels of  
physiological reactivity to pain have been found to lead to poorer long-term outcomes in 
people with chronic pain (Verhoeven et al., 2006). 
 
However, the ongoing difficulty with pursuing this kind of research is that because of 
the variety of theoretical ideas about how psychological factors might interact with pain, 
there are an extremely large number of potentially interesting variables to investigate 
and so a coherent picture may be hard to maintain (Linton, 2000). Furthermore, there 
may be a danger of over analysing the phenomenon such that relationships are split into 
smaller and smaller parts and the purpose of the research is in danger of being lost. An 
alternative approach to take would be a more clinically focussed direction, with the 
investigation of imagery-based interventions.  
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As discussed in section 6.6, the systematic investigation of interventions which utilise 
imagery methods is warranted. Future research could also explore the nature of changes 
which may occur during intervention processes, which could enable their clinical 
effectiveness to be maximised. There are many potential hypotheses which could be 
investigated, as imagery-focussed work could involve, from a CBT perspective, the 
processes of extinction, habituation and reattribution of meaning. Alternatively, from an 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (e.g. Hayes et al., 2003) perspective, working 
with images may promote the acceptance of them and distancing which could allow an 
uncoupling from hypothesised types of maladaptive behaviours promoted by imagery.  
 
The investigation of any imagery interventions or associated variables would be well-
served by the inclusion of more objective measurements such as physiological markers 
or perhaps brain imaging methods such as functional MRI. Furthermore, as discussed in 
previous sections, a well developed and standardised measure which captures the key 
elements of pain-related mental images would significantly contribute to the 
progression of this field. As a starting point, single case experimental designs may be a 
useful tool to begin to investigate differences between different methods of direct 
interventions with chronic pain imagery.  
 
6.9 Conclusions 
This study indicates that, for people who spontaneously report experiencing chronic 
pain imagery, evoking these images results in a temporary increase in pain intensity, 
sadness, anger and disgust and a decrease in happiness. While these emotional 
responses are no different from those elicited when people describe their pain in single 
words, this verbal task does not result in the increase in pain intensity seen when images 
are evoked. This represents an important contribution to the currently small but growing 
literature investigating these spontaneous pain-related mental images, which has 
important theoretical and clinical implications. Although a number of self-help and 
clinical texts recommend ways in which to intervene through the direct manipulation of 
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pain images, further systematic research is necessary to establish whether these are 
effective and if so, understand how these techniques lead to improvements. Because of 
its idiosyncratic and analogical nature, imagery is a challenging field in which to 
conduct research. However, as highlighted by Turk and Okifuji (2002, p.678): 
„Although there remain obstacles, there are also opportunities for psychologists to 
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